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1 – Introduction  
 
Within the general framework of a panel about “Minorities in Context. 
Alevis, Shi’as and Pagans in Europe and Turkey,” in this article, we will 
provide an overview of the social and legal status of Alevis in Turkey and 
Western Europe regarding their “minority” status. Alevis, a native 
religious community of Anatolia, are a significant “minority” group who 
started migrating to big cities in Turkey in the 1950s and becoming a part 
of the guest worker community in the 1960s, especially in Germany. In 
Turkey, Alevis are not recognized as a minority group but are considered 
within Islam, which makes causes them to be deprived of certain religious 
and juridical rights. On 26 April 2016, European Court decisions brought 
to public attention the political rights of the Alevis, emphasizing the 
crucial intersection of Art. 9 and Art. 14 ECHR, given safeguarding the 
basic structure protecting the essential aspects of religious freedom. 
Here will first present historical and sociological overview on the 
Alevis. This section will rely on the preliminary findings of the 
ethnographic research Gedik and Birkalan-Gedik conducted on Alevis and 
Alevi women in Germany (2010-2017),1 developing in several intervals. 
                                                             
* The paper, not peer evaluated, was originally presented at the EUARE Conference 
2019, at the panel “Minorities in Context: Alevis, Shi’as and Pagans in Europe and 
Turkey,” chaired by Professor Silvio Ferrari.  
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Their research methodology embraces participant-observation in Alevi 
organisations, which is enriched by in-depth interviews with key 
personalities in Alevi organisations, including AABF-Almanya Alevi 
Birlikleri Federasyonu,2 (The Alevi Community in Germany) AAKB-
Almanya Alevi Kadınlar Birliği3 (Alevi Women’s Union, Germany), 
AABF-İnanç Kurulu4 (The Belief Council), in addition to the consultations 
and interviews with the Alevi religious leaders. Additionally, Gedik and 
Birkalan-Gedik used visual sources, such as blogs, news feeds, or posts on 
Alevism by the Alevi associations that are available on the internet.  
Gedik and Birkalan-Gedik expect that this overview helps to 
contextualize the legal cases of the Alevis in Turkey, which will be 
presented by Madera. We plea for interdisciplinary research, based on 
historical, cultural, and social perspectives on Alevis, grounded with solid 
gender lenses. Only after understanding the situation of Alevis in their 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Hande Birkalan-Gedik and Erdoğan Gedik availed of the assistance of Turgut Öker, 
Mürvet Öztürk, Yılmaz Kahraman, Hüseyin Mat, Özlem Gökdemir, Fuat Gökdemir, 
Öznur Tur, and Derviş Tur for their research (paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12).  
Adelaide Madera relied on Hande Birkalan-Gedik’s support for Turkish terminology 
and orthography, and took advantage of Hande Birkalan-Gedik’s constructive 
suggestions during the development of her writing (paragraphs 1, 8, 9, 10, 11). 
Erdoğan Gedik is the author of paragraphs: 1. Introduction, 2. Alevi Population in 
Turkey and in Europe, 3. What is Alevism? Who are the Alevis? 5. Alevi Migration in 
Turkey and to Europe, 6. Alevi Organizations in Europe: Cultural, Social, and Historical 
Perspectives, 7. Discourses of “Other” vs “Equal” on Alevis, 12. Concluding Remarks on 
Social and Cultural Issues. Hande Birkalan-Gedik is the author of paragraphs: 1. 
Introduction, 4. Discrimination against Alevis and Alevi Massacres from the Ottoman 
Empire to the Turkish Republic, 6. Alevi Organizations in Europe: Cultural, Social, and 
Historical Perspectives, 7. Discourses of “Other” vs “Equal” on Alevis, 12. Concluding 
Remarks on Social and Cultural Issues. Adelaide Madera is the author of the paragraphs: 
1. Introduction, 8. Alevi Associations in Europe: Legal Perspectives, 9. Alevism in the 
Turkish Legal Setting, 10. Alevism at the European Court of Human Rights, 11. 
Concluding Remarks on Legal Issues.  
1 Most of Gedik’s and Birkalan-Gedik’s research focuses on Alevi women within the 
Alevi associations as subjects of transnational space. As such, it examines whether their 
political participation refers to the equality discourses, particularly, to ethnicity, 
multicultural or integration politics in German or Turkish organizations, or only to 
negotiation of gender orders with patriarchy in transnational space.  
2 AABF is the acronym for Alevi Community in Germany - Alevitische Gemeinde 
Deutschland e.V. It was named as Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (European Federation 
of Alevi Communities) and later was named as Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu, 
which is the umbrella association of Alevis in Germany.  
3 AAKB is the acronym in Turkish for Germany Alevi Women’s Union.  
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native Turkey and their lives in European states, the current juridical and 
political cases before the European Court can make sense. Our analysis 
will be meaningful, especially, if one considers the fact that since 2002, 
Turkey has been ruled by the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/Justice 
and Development Party) government. The AKP has strong tendencies for 
Islam and use conservative policies that are working against the Alevis, 
although in the first years in the office, AKP followed more liberal policies 
regarding the Alevis, widely known as Alevi açılımı (the Alevi opening),5 
whereby Alevis, “for the first time, came to be involved in political 
processes for official recognition and accommodation, but also because the 
process was handled by a political party which is regarded to have 
retained Islamist roots in Sunni interpretation.”6 On the other hand, other 
scholars also underlined the precarious relationship between the Turkish 
State and the Alevis.7  
However, many also underline that the party uses religion as a “re-
born element” in the Turkish political scene and continuously transforms 
several domains including the media, the Kurdish issue, implementation 
of the rule of law, foreign policy, and gender issues.8 In the light of these 
developments, especially the Turkish/Sunni-Hanafi identity becomes an 
overwhelming majority in governance affecting the lives of the Alevis in 
various spheres of everyday life. 
Madera will analyse five cases between 2007-2016 at the European 
Court. We conclude that, currently, Turkey does not try to suffice the 
European requirements, namely, the implementation of policies aimed at 
guaranteeing adequate protection of the collective dimension of religious 
freedom in a way consistent with European directives. Specifically, 
                                                             
5 It should be noted that the Alevi opening, like the Kurdish opening, became a 
problematic issue in Turkey. Started in 2007, the AKP government presented a 
rapprochement policy toward the Alevis, aiming to include Alevis within the decisions 
that were taken about them in the political sphere. However, the process has been 
criticized by politicians and academics alike that it failed to use inclusionary measures 
and instead increased the discrimination against Alevis. For a critical commentary, see B. 
A. SONER, Ş. TOKTAŞ, Alevis and Alevism in the Changing Context of Turkish Politics: The 
Justice and Development Party’s Alevi Opening, in Turkish Studies, vol. 12, no. 3, 2011, pp. 
419-434. 
6 See for example, C. LORD, Rethinking the Justice and Development Party’s ‘Alevi 
Openings’ in Turkish Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, 2017, pp. 278-296. 
7 See A. ÇARKOĞLU, N. ÇAĞIN BİLGİLİ. A Precarious Relationship: The Alevi 
Minority, the Turkish State and the EU, in South European Society and Politics, vol. 16/2, pp. 
351-364. 
8 See H. YAVUZ, A. E. ÖZTÜRK, Turkish Secularism and Islam Under the Reign of 
Erdoğan in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 19, 2019, pp 1-9.  
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Turkey’s implementation of its Constitutional secular framework is not 
coherent at all with the ECHR understanding of state neutrality. Future 
developments will depend on the active intent of Turkish governance to 
maintain its engagement in becoming part of European Union as well in 
the potentially fruitful interaction between different legal actors, strategies 
and rationales because of the promotion of progressive changes in the 
current framework.  
  
 
2 - Alevi Population in Turkey and in Europe  
 
Alevis are an Anatolian heterodox religious community who form the 
second-largest religious group in Turkey, after the overwhelming Sunni 
and Shafii population.9 Yet, the number of Alevis living in Turkey are 
contested. Unfortunately, the Turkish Statistic Institute (known as TUİK) 
does not keep any figures related to the religion. Therefore, the exact 
numbers about the Alevis remain as “estimations,” which are based on 
self-identification and can be gathered from other reports prepared either 
by private research agencies or by other political parties. Although there 
have been different figures about the number of Alevis in Turkey, which 
range from 5 to 25 million, reliable scholarly sources can identify the 
number to be around 12-13 million. According to a survey in 2014, done 
by CHP (Republican People’s Party), the secular, pro-Alevi party, the 
overall Alevi population is 12.521.792. However, most other estimates go 
around between 13-15 million.10  
To find out about the exact number of Alevis in Europe and in 
Turkey is problematic from various angles and for many reasons. First, 
because of centuries-long oppression, massacres, othering, labelling, and 
social exclusion, Alevi community in Turkey practised a tradition, called 
takiye, requiring that the Alevi identity should be hidden in public, but 
                                                             
9 Islam has several branches and schools, which are results of leadership disputes 
among the Muslims, leading to the development of distinct religious identities within 
Islam. Sunni Islam is the largest branch of Islam, whose followers make 85-90% of the 
Muslims, differs from the Shia Islam, which makes the rest of the Muslim population. 
Within Sunni branch of Islam, there are four notable schools on jurisprudence, founded 
by the imam, the religious leaders, Ibn-i Hanbal (Hanbali), Abu Hanifa (Hanafi), Malek 
(Maliki), and El-Shafei (Shafii). Sunni Turks in belonging mostly to the Hanafi school of 
Islam, while Kurds in Turkey mostly practice the Shafii branch of Sunni Islam. However, 
some Kurds identify themselves as Alevis and practising this syncretic religion.  
10 https://www.haberler.com/chp-li-ozbolat-ulke-genelinde-12-milyon-521-bin-5732812-habe 
ri/). [Accessed 5 February 2019]. See S. AKKİRAZ, Report: http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-
siyaset/sabahat-akkirazdan-alevi-raporu-haberi-64266. [Accessed 5 February 2019]. 
 
55 
Rivista telematica (https://www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 17 del 2020                ISSN 1971- 8543 
practised in private. The takiye tradition continued until the 1980s, when 
Alevis started migrating to Turkish cities and Western Europe, and when 
they organized themselves openly in political and cultural organizations.11 
However, in Turkey, they are not freed from being stereotyped (especially 
the Alevi women are labelled as “loose” because of their co-gendered 
worship, which the Sunni Islamic counterpart does not have). Therefore, 
because of long years of silence and hiding their identities, it was not easy 
for Alevis to openly declare themselves as Alevis, also in the statistics, 
because of fearing discrimination and violence.12  
The second reason as to why Alevi identity remained somehow 
hidden also has a political dimension. Only non-Muslims have been 
recognized and protected under the Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed 
on 24 July 1923, in Switzerland. The Turkish State considers Alevism 
under Islam, but not as a religious belonging or identity category. The 
Turkish state statistics are based on self-declaration. As a result, the 
numbers of Alevis are based on estimations and they have been reputably 
reduced, to minimize the Alevi presence in Turkey. This demographic 
detail is essential since it can point out to an ambiguity of the Alevi 
identity and their “non-minority” status.13  
 
Table: Alevi Population in Europe14 
 
                                                             
11 See M. SÖKEFELD. Einleitung: Aleviten in Deutschland: Von takiye zur alevitischen 
Bewegung, in M. SÖKEFELD, (ed.) Aleviten in Deutschland: Identitätsprozesse einer 
Religionsgemeinschaft in der Diaspora, Transcript, Bielefeld, 2015, pp. 7-36.  
12 See E. GEDİK, H. BİRKALAN GEDİK, N.D. Alevi Women in Transnational Space. 
Ethnic Differentiation, Multicultural Politics, or Gender Negotiation? Work-in-Progress 
Manuscript. Hande Birkalan-Gedik presented a part of this text at the EuARe Zero 
Conference in 2017 and at the EuARe Conference in 2018.  
13 See A. ERDEMİR ET AL. Türkiye’de Alevi Olmak: Being Alevi in Turkey. Avrupa 
Demokrasi ve İnsan Hakları Komisyonu, Ankara, 2010.  
14 Prepared by E. Gedik and H. Birkalan-Gedik. The figures are based on the 
consultancy with the Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland and with the representatives 
Hüseyin Mat and Turgut Öker. Also, the numbers have been cross tabulated with the 
data found in Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland, as well as with the publications of the 






Per cent in the 
population 
Austria 9.000.000 80.000 0,89% 
Germany  82.000.000 800.000 0,98% 
France 67.000.000 200.000 0,30% 
England 53.000.000 300.000 0,57% 
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The above table presents the number of the population in Germany. 
The numbers are based on a cross-tabulation, taking into account the 
estimated number given to Gedik and Birkalan-Gedik by Turgut Öker, the 
former president of the Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (AABF), the 
Alevi Association in Germany.15 It also uses information provided by the 
current president Hüseyin Mat and the secretary-general Ufuk Çakır. The 
Alevi organization is the official representative of the Alevis in Germany. 
Although AABF calculates the “organized” Alevi families under the 
umbrella of AABF, it is also based on estimations. As Sökefeld noted, 
“since Alevism, neither in Turkey nor Germany is an official category, the 
Alevis were not reported separately in migration. Thus, there are no 
official statistics on the Alevi immigration to Germany.”16  
This information should be read vis-à-vis the German-Islam 
Conference Research Report in German published in 2009, where the 
number of Alevis are stated to be „480.000 - 552.000, of which 92% belong 
to a Turkish origin.17 This report was published in 2009, based on the 
conference which was convened by the German state officials on 27 




3 – What is Alevism? Who are the Alevis?  
 
                                                             
15 See T. ÖKER, Interview with Hande Birkalan Gedik, Köln-Germany. 16 December 
2014. 
16 See M. SÖKEFELD, Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany and in 
Transnational Space, Berghahn, Oxford, 2008, p. 7.  
17 See S. HAUG, S. MÜSSIG, A. STICHS, Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland im 
Auftrag der Deutschen Islam Konferenz, Bundesamt für Migration u. Flüchtlinge, Berlin, 
2009, p. 314. 
18 See E. GEDİK, H. BİRKALAN-GEDİK, N.D. Alevi Women in Transnational Space, cit.  
Italy 61.000.000 N/A N/A 
Sweden 10.000.000 12.000 0,12% 
Switzerland 8.300.000 70.000 0,84% 
Holland 17.000.000 200.000 1,18% 
Belgium 12.000.000 50.000 0,42% 
Turkey 80.000.000 13.000.000 16,25% 
    Europe 399.300.000 14.712.000 3,68% 
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Alevism can be defined from cultural, religious, and historical angles, 
which are not separate, but interrelated. Culturally speaking, Alevism, can 
be defined as a rural religion, which presents oral characteristics both in its 
religious sources and practices. The rurality of the Alevis remained, at 
least until the internal migration in Turkey, which started developing in 
the late 1950s.19 Alevis enjoy the company of saz, the long-neck lute, in 
their religious rituals as well as in everyday life. Alevis use religious 
poetry in their rituals, but also out of ritualistic contexts. The examples of 
folk poetry sung and performed by the Alevi poets are very big and with 
the extension of television broadcasting and cassette and CD industry, 
transgress the local, regional and national borders, thus presents a 
transnational aspect. 
Alevism can be described as a religion that rarely requires a place of 
worship, as the dedes or pirs – the religious leaders, who are—mostly 
men—can perform Alevi religious rituals in any home that had welcomed 
them. The place of worship for the Alevis became an issue, first through 
internal, and second through international migration, as the traditional 
community ties were broken in the course of migration.20  
Another aspect that often distinguishes Alevis from their Sunni 
counterparts is that, unlike the Sunni tradition, where women and men are 
separated during religious service, the Alevi worship has an equal place 
for men and women. The Alevi ritual-dance, known as semâh. While 
emphasizing a more democratic society, valuing education, and reserving 
a higher place for women.21 
What is Alevism? This question opens an on-going debate as to 
identify the belief and the believers. While Alevism is frequently 
categorized under the Shia denomination of Islam, it is significantly 
different. On the one hand, as with Shia Muslims, Alevis consider the 
Prophet Mohammed’s descendants (12 Imams) as holy and see them as 
their philosophic leaders. Alevis refer to Imam Ali, the cousin and son-in-
law of the Prophet Mohammed, and the chain of the twelve Imams. 
Kerbela and the martyrdom of Imam Hüseyin, the grandson of 
Mohammad and the son of Ali, are also important points of historical 
reference and was referred by many Alevis as the first massacre. From the 
                                                             
19 See E. GEDİK, Sozialer, kultureller, ökonomischer und sprachlicher Wandel im Rahmen 
der Binnenmigration und der transnationalen Migration: soziale Netzwerke am Beispiel der 
Provinz Varto in Ostanatolien, Türkei, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 2008, pp. 223-
273.  
20 See. E. GEDİK. Sozialer, kultureller, ökonomischer und sprachlicher Wandel im Rahmen 
der Binnenmigration und der transnationalen Migration, cit., p. 225.  
21 See E. GEDİK, H. BİRKALAN-GEDİK, N.D. Alevi Women in Transnational Space, cit. 
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perspective of the history of religion, Alevism could, therefore, be 
assigned to Shiite Islam. In its beliefs and especially in its ritual cem, 
Alevism differs fundamentally from the “orthodox” versions of both Shiite 
and Sunni Islam. Therefore, it is much more analytical to address Alevism 
as a syncretic belief system, i.e. as a religion that has elements from 
different belief systems, such as Shamanism, Zoroastrianism, and even 
from Christianity.  
As Martin Sökefeld noted that the seemingly simple question of 
where Alevism belong poses a significant problem for the self-
identification of Alevis in Germany, leading several conflicts within Alevi 
communities. From the perspective of Islam or religious studies, this 
question may not be necessary; clearly, Alevism has arisen from Muslim 
traditions, especially those related to Shia, although Alevism also has 
“heterodox“ elements in its rituals and beliefs.22 However, rituals and 
doctrines can be interpreted in different and sometimes mutually 
exclusive ways. Therefore, this may not be a distinguishing factor. On the 
other hand, whether Alevism is defined within Islam, politically and 
juristically, it makes a difference for the Alevis as where to locate them as 
a religious group, a minority, a sect within Islam, or entirely outside of 
Islam.  
Alevism can also be described in other terms. Borovalı and Boyraz 
underlined that it Alevism is “sometimes defined as faith-based collective 
activism, an ethnic identity, a transnational social movement,”23 Martin 
Sökefeld sees Alevis a socio-religious community24 while Melikoff 
identifies Alevism as “true humanism that can be traced back to the 
ancient Turks.”25 
Historically speaking, the origins and development of Alevism 
have been traced back differently among the ethnic groups, as Alevism is 
a shared belief system among Turks and Kurds in Turkey. While the 
designation “Alevi” has been used since the early 20th century as a 
                                                             
22 See M. SÖKEFELD, Sind Aleviten Muslime? Aspekte einer Debatte unter Aleviten in 
Deutschland” Ethnoscripts, vol. 7, no. 2, 2005, p. 128.  
23 See M. BOROVALI, C. BOYRAZ, Turkish Secularism and Islam: A Difficult Dialogue 
with the Alevis in Philosophy Social Criticism, vol. 40, 2014a, pp. 479-488.  
24 See M. SÖKEFELD, Religion or Culture?: Concepts of Identity in the Alevi Diaspora, in 
W. KOKOT, K. TÖLÖYAN, C. ALFONSO (eds.), Diaspora, Identity and Religion, 
Routledge, London, 2004, pp. 133-155.  
25 See earlier studies esp. I. MELIKOFF, Uyur idik Uyardılar: Alevilik-Bektaşilik 
Araştırmaları, Cem, Istanbul, 1993. Also, see M. BOROVALI, C. BOYRAZ, The Alevi 
Workshops: An Opening Without an Outcome? in Turkish Studies 2015, v. 16, no. 2, pp. 145-
160. Added references belong to Gedik and Birkalan-Gedik.  
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collective term for several religious groups such as Bektaşi, Tahtacı, and 
Abdal, and today is used instead of the pejorative term Kızılbaş (“Red-
Heads”). Known as Kızılbaş, these groups respond to social, political, and 
religious developments in Asia Minor from the 11th century onwards, after 
the Mongol invasion of Anatolia. However, Alevis have been present in 
Anatolia at least from the 13th century onwards.  
Karin Vorhoff underlines that the academics who work on Alevism 
since the early days of the Turkish Republic, refused to recognize the 
syncretic nature of Alevi and Bektaşi belief systems. According to Vorhoff, 
instead, they only spoke of a homogeneous element of Turkish culture26) 
and neglected other ethnic and religious borders and boundaries. 
Supporting the difference in religious practice, for example, Irène Mélikoff 
argued that the nomadic groups in Anatolia practised an entirely different 
form of Islam. They were under the influence of various charismatic 
itinerant dervishes, religious figures, many of whom came from Central 
Asia and belonged to mystical orders such as the Qalandariyya,27 
Yasawiyya,28 and Haydariyya,29 with elements of from Manichaeism and 
Buddhism.30  
While Alevism was considered as a “purely” Turkish and Turkic 
religion, the official discourse on the Alevis overlooked the Kurdish 
elements in Alevism. At the same time, the Kurdish-Alevis historiography 
wanted to trace the origins of this belief system to Zoroastrianism and 
other ancient Iranian religions. For example, some scholars, see Alevism 
concerning Zoroastrianism, to Ehl-i Haqq31 and Christianity.32 Finally, 
                                                             
26 See K. VORHOFF Alevism, or Can Islam be Secular? in Les annales de l’autre Islam, 
1999, no. 6, pp. 135-151.  
27 Shahrokh Raei notes that Qalandariyya is a group of celibate mendicant wandering 
ascetics, who has eastern Iranian and Central Asian origin, appears in fifth to eleventh-
century sources.  
28 See T. ZARCONE, Yasawiyya, IN P. BEARMAN, TH. BIANQUIS, C.E. 
BOSWORTH, E. VAN DONZEL, W.P. HEINRICHS (eds.) Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second 
Edition, 2012, Consulted online on 18 July 2020, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-
3912_islam_SIM_7991>. 
29 Haydariyya is one of the two groups under Qalandariyya. See R. SHAHROKH, 
Ḥaydariyya, in K. FLEET, G. KRÄMER, D. MATRINGE, J. NAWAS, E. ROWSON (eds.), 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, First published online 2020, consulted online on 25 July 
2020, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_30410.  
30 See I. MÉLIKOFF, Hadji Bektach: Un mythe et ses avatars: Genèse et évolution du 
soufisme populaire en Turquie, Brill, Leiden, 1998.  
31 Literally means “people of truth” and it refers to a syncretistic religion or, according 
to some adherents, an esoteric Shīʿī community, that appears to have emerged first 
among the Gūrān of southern Kurdistan in the fifteenth or sixteenth century C.E. and that 
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finding sources in the ancient cultures as the basis for an Alevi identity 
carries a critical political component, as the Turkish Republic, from its 
early days of the and onwards, refused to recognize the syncretic nature of 
Alevi belief systems. Furthermore, instead, the official discourse on 
Alevism only spoke of a homogeneous element of Turkish culture and 
neglected the Kurdish elements in Anatolian Alevism.33  
Alevis should be also thought in relation to ethnic boundaries. 
Although Turkish Alevis form the largest ethnic group among the Alevis, 
the Kurmanji and Zaza speaking Alevis form a second large group. Here, 
besides ethnic terms, the linguistic terms as to Alevis mother tongue to be 
Kurmanji and Zazaki, plays an important role and make the boundaries of 
ethnic, linguistic and religious borders even more porous and flexible. For 
this reason, all these definitions which come from the axis of language-
religion-ethnicity, over the time, are also influenced by political actions 
and to explain Alevism exclusively within the framework of Turkishness 
remains insufficient.34  
Furthermore, although Alevism is a religious identity belonging to 
both Turks and Kurds, Turkish Alevism and Kurdish Alevism differ. Each 
group interprets their faith according to their own culture and traditions. 
The Turkish-specific understanding of Alevism means that the Kurdish 
Alevis are marginalised. In fact, groups in different regions interpreted 
and applied their traditional beliefs differently in Alevism, in different 
times.35 
That is why Kurdish Alevis from the east of Turkey call themselves, 
in emic terms (self-identification) Kızılbaş in order to differ from the 
western Bektashism. From an emic (outside) perspective however, Kızılbaş 
has been used, by the Turkish counterpart, as a derogatory term, as during 
the Ottoman times, it meant to refer to the groups who were identified 
                                                                                                                                                                       
survives in various parts of Iran and Iraq, among Gūrān, Lurs, Kurds, Azerbaijanis, and 
Persians. See M. VAN BRUINESSEN, Ahl-i Ḥaqq, in K. FLEET, G. KRÄMER, D. MATRINGE, J. 
NAWAS, E. ROWSON (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, 2009. Consulted online on 27 
July 2020.  
32 See M. BAYRAK, Alevilik ve Kürtler, Öz-Ge, Istanbul, 1997.  
33 See E. GEDİK, Sozialer, kultureller, ökonomischer und sprachlicher Wandel, cit., pp. 23-
25, and its bibliographical references. 
34 See E. GEDİK, Sozialer, kultureller, ökonomischer und sprachlicher Wandel, cit., pp. 226- 
248. 
35 See E. GEDİK, Migrant Organisations in Turkey and Germany: Local, Transnational and 
Global Contexts of Kurdish-Alevis from Varto, Turkey, in Urban Anthropology and Studies of 




Rivista telematica (https://www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 17 del 2020                ISSN 1971- 8543 
with the Iranian Safawids, because of the religious affiliation, the enemies 
of the Ottoman Sultan. Kızılbaşlık is a form of Kurdish Alevism and 
Bektashism is a form of Turkish Alevism. In addition, Kızılbaş Alevism is a 
religion or sect (mezheb), while Bektashism36 is a dervish brotherhood 
(tarikat).37 Interestingly, the lineage (soy) play an important role in the 
transmission of religious knowledge and religious leadership, as Alevi 
dedes should come from the religious lineage. Although this situation is 
changing in the context of transnational migration, particularly in the 
context of Germany, where individuals who attend the religious classes, 
can become Alevi leaders. Yet, until today, Alevi religious leaders should 
belong to a religious lineage, identified as (has). It plays a crucial role in 




4 - Discrimination Against Alevis and Alevi Massacres from the 
Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic  
 
The Alevi communities in Anatolia have been exposed to different forms 
of discrimination since the Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey, leading 
the community into social and economic isolation and at times, into 
displacement at the social and economic margins, as a survival strategy. 
Especially, with the embedded ethnic and linguistic “otherness” the Alevi 
identity has been marginalised and Alevis faced higher degrees of 
discrimination, at times, resulting in several massacres both in the 
Ottoman Empire and in the Turkish Republic.  
Generally, speaking, however, on the one hand, the Alevis could 
practice their religion in isolation and keep their traditions alive. Known 
as takiye, we will discuss this secrecy in the following sections more in 
detail. But, despite their self-retreat, they were not still freed from 
                                                             
36 The Bektaşiyye (Bektāshiyya), a Ṣ ūfī order established in ninth/fifteenth-century 
Anatolia by Balım Sultan (Bālım Sulṭ ān, d. 925/1519) and named after Hacı Bektaş Veli 
(Ḥ ācī Bektāş Velī, d. 669/1270), lay at the crossroads of several Muslim antinomian 
trends. See T. ZARCONE, Bektaşiyye, in K. FLEET, G. KRÄMER, D. MATRINGE, J. 
NAWAS, E. ROWSON (eds.) Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, 2014. Consulted online on 27 
July 2020. 
37 See E. GEDİK, Varto Alevileri: Etnisite, Din ve Kültür (Alevis in Varto: Ethnicity, 
Religion and Culture) in E. ÇAĞLAYAN (ed.), Burası Muş’tur: Tarih, Toplum, Kültür ve 
Edebiyat, İletişim, İstanbul, 2019, pp. 226-227. 
38 See E. GEDİK, Sozialer, kultureller, ökonomischer und sprachlicher Wandel, cit., p. 127. 
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massacres and other forms of social and political discriminations even in 
the modern Turkish Republic, who took Alevis as “secular” citizens. 
With the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the on-
going reforms well into the 1930s, many Alevis maintained high hopes for 
their existence and treatment as citizens equal to the Sunni majority, 
especially under the light of the promised secularization of the Turkish 
state. The new Turkish state has abolished the caliphate, as Ottoman 
sultans became the leaders of the Islamic community in 1517 after 
Ottomans gained control of Egypt. The Şer’iye ve Evkaf Vekaleti (Ministry of 
Islamic Law and Foundations) was established in 1924. The Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı (Directorate of Religious Affairs, thereafter, Diyanet) was 
formed as a new government agency in the same year, functioning 
directly under the Office of the Prime Minister and becoming responsible 
for carrying out activities related to Islam.39  
Its establishment illustrates the state's desire to control religion 
through its secularist vision. However, this is not a predominant 
characteristic throughout the years. With changing governments, some of 
the parties have been more sympathetic to Islam and even aligned them 
with religion. As Yavuz and Elveren note “the history of the modern 
Turkish Republic is shaped by the forces of secularism (laiklik) and 
Islamism. The relationship between the two forces has not always been 
hostile, as there have been periods of engagement as well as co-
optation.”40 Today the Diyanet functions under the Presidency of the 
Republic of Turkey under the name of Presidency of Religious Affairs. 
They are financed by the Turkish tax-payers’ money, regardless of their 
religious domination, including the Alevis, who have their own house of 
worship, the cemevi, or Christians or Jews, who would not go to mosques 
for worship.  
It should be also mentioned that, it is not only to the disadvantage 
of the Alevis, but to other non-Sunni groups in Turkey, that they do not 
have representative in Diyanet. 12-15 million Sunni Kurds who follow the 
Shafii and not the Hanafi school of Islam, as well as three million Shi’a, 
and over a million Nusayris, who are known as Alawites, and not to be 
confused with the Alevis.41 In that respect, Birkalan-Gedik noted that the 
                                                             
39 See H. BİRKALAN-GEDİK, Muslim | Martyr | Masculine: Reading the AKP’s “new” 
Nationalism and the “Attempted Coup” on 15 July 2016 through Intersectional Feminist Lenses, 
in Limina, vol. 2/1, 2019, pp. 109-137.  
40 See H. YAVUZ, A. ERDİ ÖZTÜRK, Turkish Secularism and Islam Under the Reign of 
Erdoğan, in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2019, vol. 19, pp. 1-19.  
41 See S. CORNELL, “The Rise of Diyanet: The Politicization of Turkey’s Directorate of 
Religious Affairs.” The Turkey Analyst. 9 October 2015. http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/ 
 
63 
Rivista telematica (https://www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 17 del 2020                ISSN 1971- 8543 
newly built mosque in Köln- Germany is financed by the DİTİB (Türkisch-
islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V. (Turkish-Islamic Union for 
Religious Affairs), and it is under the auspice of the Diyanet. The Diyanet 
is financed by the Turkish tax-payers’ money, regardless of their religious 
domination (including the Alevis, who have their own house of worship, 
the Cemevi, or Christians or Jews, who would not go to mosques for 
worship. This case, in and of itself, is illustrative of the Sunni politics both 
inside and outside religious discourses. 42  
Going back to the status of the Alevis under such a great majority of 
Sunni-Islam, it is important to note that the existence of the Alevis did not 
receive any special protection.43 To the contrary, Alevis became targets of 
the extremist Sunni groups. There were open attacks on the Alevis. 
Attacks towards Alevis in Malatya and Maraş in 197844 Moreover, in 
Çorum in 1980 killed several Alevis. With the military coup d’état on 12 
September 1980, not much changed although the military government saw 
itself as guardian of Kemalist ideas and democratic values, with the 
national ideology of the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” Sunni religion 
regained control.  
In Çorum, the massacres towards Alevis started place in May 1980, 
just a couple of months before the military coup on 12 September 1980 and 
continued until July of the same year. It is reported that 57 Alevis have 
been massacred and hundreds of them were injured by the right-wing 
nationalist and Islamicist militants in a neighbourhood called Milönü, 
which was predominantly Alevi. The militants first started damaging 
shops, which are known as to be owned by Alevi or “Leftists” which were 
located on a very crowed street in Çorum, attacking newspapers and 
bookstores and blocking all the inter-city roads of Çorum.45  
Alevi massacres continued in the 1990s. In 1993, an Alevi Cultural 
Festival was celebrated in Sivas, a city in central-eastern Turkey. Not only 
the Alevi intellectuals and artists but also several Left-wing scholars, 
artists, poets, and thinkers were gathered at the Madımak Hotel when 
                                                                                                                                                                       
publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/463-the-rise-of-diyanet-the-politicization-of-turkey%E2 
%80%99s-directorate-of-religious-affairs.html. [Accessed on 24 July 2020]. 
42 See H. BİRKALAN-GEDİK, Muslim | Martyr | Masculine, cit., pp. 109-137. 
43 See K. VORHOFF, Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft: Alevitische 
Identität in der Türkei, Klaus Schwarz, Berlin, 1995, p. 71. 
44 See E. SINCLAIR-WEBB, Sectarian Violence, the Alevi Minority and the Left. 
Kahramanmaraş 1978, in P.J. WHITE, J. JONGERDEN, (ed.), Turkey's Alevi Enigma: A 
Comprehensive Overview, Brill, Leiden, 2003, pp. 215-236. 
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their hotel was put on fire by the Islamic groups. The arson killed 37 
individuals. Not all the deceased were Alevis, but it was clear that Alevis 
were the main target against the hegemonic Sunni right wing. The 
“reluctance” to interfere with the fire department and police caused 37 
people to die in this arson attack.  
Alevis in Gazi Mahallesi, a migrant neighbourhood in the European 
side of Istanbul, with highly Kurdish and Alevi population, were targeted 
on 12 March 1995, particularly at a coffeehouse where most of them 
habitually gathered.46 These attacks took place only two years after the 
devastating massacre in Sivas. In Gazi Mahallesi, most of the Alevis 
belonged to working-class families, who could earn their living in blue-
collar sectors. Dural outlines that, together with economic stress, political, 
cultural and historical marginalization as well as religious oppression, 
Alevis started their protests in the Gazi Mahallesi where police attacks 
caused several Alevis to lose their lives.  
Alevis became targets in 2013, at the Gezi Taksim Gezi Park 
protests in Istanbul, where even Alevi were children killed. Although it 
cannot be totally proven, there is great amount evidence that Alevis took 
part vehemently at the Gezi Park protests. For example, Berkin Elvan who 
was 14 years old then, after remained 269 days in coma, died. He is only 
one of the seven Alevis have been killed by the police during the Gezi 
events, after which the Alevis relation to the government went downhill.47 
The transnational space became an effective medium to motivate 
Alevi awareness in the 1990s. In that respect, it is difficult to argue for 
totally separate Turkish and German contexts regarding Alevism, as Esra 
Özyürek showed that Alevi organizations in Germany were influential in 
spearheading the identity politics in Turkey.48  
Mainly the idea of a “third-space” is essential when one thinks 
about the attacks against the Alevis. The massacres in 1993 Sivas and 1995 
Gazi in Turkey were identified as the last stroke that broke the camel’s 
back, creating awareness for being an Alevi in Turkey but also in 
Germany, which, in turn, also effected the Alevi identity and Alevi 
mobilization in transnational space by large. Indeed, one should not forget 
that the neo-Nazis put fire on the home of 5 young Turkish girls in 
                                                             
46 See T.F. DURAL, Aleviler ve Gazi Olayları, Ant, Istanbul, 1995. 
47 M. BARDAKÇI, A. FREYBERG-İNAN, C. GIESEL, O. LEISSE, Religious Minorities 
in Turkey: Alevi, Armenians, and Syriacs and the Struggle to Desecuritize Religious Freedom, 
Palgrave Mac Millan, Oxford, 2017, p. 124.  
48 See E.ÖYZÜREK, The Light of the Alevi Fire Was Lit in Germany and then Spread to 
Turkey: A Transnational Debate on the Boundaries of Islam, in Turkish Studies, vol. 10, no. 2, 
2009, pp. 233-253. 
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Solingen-Germany in the 1990s and burning of the 37 people in Sivas-
Turkey might have contributed to the emergence of Alevi organizations. 
Az Mürvet Öztürk underlined in one of our interviews, the identity 
question was the central question among the Kurds, Turks, and the Alevis 
in the 1900s, asking “whether you belong to the ‘burner’ or the “burnt”?“49 
Although the politically motivated Alevis in the 1980s actively organized 
the community, their official recognition started only towards the end of 
1980s.  
Apart from these horrible incidents, where Alevis became a victim, 
most of the Alevis in Turkey have distanced themselves from the Sunni 
Islam, although their situation vis a vis the Turkish State has been mostly 
ambivalent and contested. Because they have been subjected to several 
massacres in the history of the Ottoman Empire, they approached the 
Turkish Republic hoping to be the guarantor of secularism. As David 
Shankland observed, this marked “a contrast to the Ottoman Empire, for 
much of the history of modern Turkey, many of the Alevis (and 
particularly Turkish Alevis) were able to identify strongly with its aims, 
and have prided themselves upon their loyalty” to the Turkish state.50 
In several European States, Alevis strive to maintain their cultural 
and religious identity, through a process of redefining and alternatively 
stressing their political commitments, their ethnic belongings, or the 
ideological-philosophical dimensions of their beliefs.  
A report published by the European Democracy and Human Right 
Commission (2010), based on field research with Alevis in different cities 
in Turkey, showed that Alevis in Turkey face discrimination in everyday 
life; for example being reminded several times that they are Alevis, not 
being invited to neighbourly gatherings, to women’s day and so on. Alevis 
face discrimination particularly during the month of Ramadan, as they do 
not observe and practice Ramadan fasting, but their fasting periods differ. 
Furthermore, Alevis are invited to join the prayers, on purpose to make 
feel discriminated. The Friday prayers take place in mosques and they are 
especially for men, especially on Fridays, but Alevis do not visit mosques. 
Most of them underlined that they must still practice takiye, to hide their 
Alevi identity at their workplace. Several of them also underlined that 
their job applications have been declined also because of their Alevi 
identity. Most of the Sunnis implied that they are not clean enough, and 
                                                             
49 M. ÖZTÜRK, Interview with Hande Birkalan-Gedik, Köln-Germany, 4 May 2010. M. 
ÖZTÜRK, Interview with Hande Birkalan-Gedik, 3 December 2014. Wetzlar-Germany.  
50 See D. SHANKLAND, The Alevis in Turkey: Emergence of a Secular Tradition, 
Routledge, London, 2003. 
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their way of cooking is not clean and so on. The Kurdish Alevis also 
underlined that their discrimination is doubled because of their ethnic 
identity and they have been called Kızılbaş, a term which is used in a 
derogatory, demeaning sense. Some of them reported that they have been 




5 – Alevi Migration in Turkey and to Europe 
 
Internal migration in Turkey is a result of a modernisation process, 
whereby Alevis also found a chance to move to the bigger cities. While 
there are several reasons for internal migration, the main reason remains 
economical. This also holds true for the Alevis. In the later years, Alevis 
also found a chance of educational mobility. As individual migrants, the 
Alevi migration can be traced back, even to mid-1940s. Erdoğan Gedik 
noted that after the devastating earthquake in Varto, a province in eastern 
Turkey in 1946, some families chose larger cities in the neighbouring 
regions, such as Mersin to migrate and establish their livelihood, because 
the town and its environs were deeply affected by the earthquake.52  
The process of Alevi internal migration from rural regions of 
Turkey to the urban centres began in the 1950s. With the military coup of 
1980, however, the Alevis came to the fore in the big cities’ public spaces. 
They began to gain a physical presence in public through the 
establishment of associations and associations and by building their own 
cemevi.53 
The foundation of cemevis in urban areas can be understood as the 
result of a rapprochement of Alevism to the structural religious 
characteristics of Sunni Islam, since rural Alevism did not know 
institutionalized social and worship centres. Rather, the cem ritual in the 
village used to be held in the house of some family. In an urban context, 
however, Alevis enter the public space through the cemevi as a place of 
                                                             
51 SEE A. ERDEMİR ET. AL., Türkiye’de Alevi Olmak, European Democracy and 
Human Rights Commission, Ankara, 2010. The pages between 30-246 are directly first-
hand quotations from the interview partners whereby they report on discrimination cases 
based on their Alevi identity.  
52 See E. GEDİK, Sozialer, kultureller, ökonomischer und sprachlicher Wandel, cit. 
53 See E. GEDİK, Rekonstruktion des Alevitentums im transnationalen Raum zwischen 
ethnischen und sprachlichen Grenzen: Das Beispiel Varto, in J. ZIMMERMANN, J. 
KAROLEWSKI, R. LANGER (eds.), Transmission Process of Religious Knowledge and Ritual 
Practice in Alevism Between Innovation and Reconstruction, Peter Lang, Berlin, 2018, pp. 251.  
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implementation. Thus, the cemevis open not only religious but also 
political spaces for the Alevis. On the other hand, the cemevi also gains 
political significance by transforming it into a place of remembrance (lieu 
de mémoire).54 
In the 1980s, as the Alevi identity has begun to crystallise through 
the Kurdish movement in Turkey and emphasised the religious and ethnic 
differences and Kurdish migration to Germany (and to other European 
countries) took place. The complicated relationship of Alevi social 
participation and the political reality started to change as the relationship 
of the Alevis in the Turkish Republic, especially after the 1990s, posed a 
new framework for evaluating their own identity—especially in the light 
of Alevi executions and exclusions as Öker underlined.55  
On the other hand, Alevis came to Germany as guest workers in the 
1960s. However, they established their associations in the 1990s, which is 
relatively late. On the other hand, the Sunni organisations that were found 
in the 1970s. However, Alevis remained invisible, as the Alevis in Europe 
did not at first organise themselves as “Alevis.” They did not claim any 
distinctiveness since they basically came either to work or for political 
reasons, as in Turkey, most Alevis who took up commitments beyond 
their daily life engaged in leftist political groups or labour unions. 
Alternatively, the first Sunni organisation in Germany was called 
Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren (VIKZ), in the 1970s. The 
Süleymancılar established the association because no others met the 
workers’ religious needs. Later, the Nurcus found their groups. The Milli 
Selamet Partisi also created an organisation called Islamische 
Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş (IGMG).56 The largest Muslim organisation in 
Germany to date is the DİTİB (Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für 
Religion e.V. – Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği). Turkish Islamic Union of the 
Religious Affairs was established in 1984 by the Committee for Religious 
Matters (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) in Turkey. Gedik notes that up to this 
date the religious affairs were handled by the German religious 
organisations, such as Caritas—depending on the religious affiliations of 
the migrants themselves in the workspace.57  
                                                             
54 E. GEDİK, Rekonstruktion des Alevitentums im transnationalen Raum zwischen 
ethnischen und sprachlichen Grenzen: Das Beispiel Varto, in J. ZIMMERMANN, J. 
KAROLEWSKI, R. LANGER (eds.), Transmission Process of Religious Knowledge and Ritual 
Practice in Alevism Between Innovation and Reconstruction, cit., pp. 254-255.  
55 T. ÖKER, Interview with Hande Birkalan-Gedik, Köln- Germany, 16 December 2014.  
56 See E. ØSTERGAARD-NIELSEN, The Politics of Migrants’ Transnational Political 
Practices, in International Migration Review, vol. 37, no. 3, 2003, p. 765.  
57 See E. GEDİK, Phänomen der “Kassetten-Briefe” der ersten Einwanderergeneration aus 
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The services of DİTİB are mainly directed to Turkish Muslims, even 
though the association is actually open for all kinds of Muslims. The 
imams working for the DİTİB are civil servants of the Turkish state, who 
are sent from Turkey for a limited period. The establishment of DİTİB in 
1984 is essential, as Gedik underlines that “when issues related to 
children’s education, ghetto life, increasing political asylum applications, 
and new visa requirements emerged in the late 1980s […] the associations 
emerged to remedy the migrants’ problems.”58 As one can expect, DİTİB’s 
services did not include Alevis, and Alevis had to organise themselves 
through self-help, a significant economic and social disadvantage for the 
Alevis. Gedik explains the visibility of migrant associations in Germany in 
the 1960s as solidarity association as due to the increase in exported 
labour. This was the pattern between 1973 and the 1980s when migrants 
from Turkey established political associations.59 In the 1990s, however, 
associations split up after their ideological disagreements, which became 
more apparent, such as between leftist and rightist groups, religious and 
secular attributions, and Kurds and Turks.  
 
 
6 - Alevi Organizations in Europe: Cultural, Social and Historical 
Perspectives  
 
The characteristics of the Alevi population in various European states, due 
to different migration patterns, different policies towards “minority 
groups,” and different constitutional rights, impacted the political status 
of the Alevis. Important in their history is that since the 1990's Alevis 
created and transformed a transnational space through their political 
mobilisation, as they became more visible and differentiated as a 
community of their own in Germany and in greater Europe.60 
                                                                                                                                                                       
der Türkei in Deutschland, within the series of lectures Das Leben als Karawanserei II: Facetten 
deutsch-türkischer Migration, Deutsche Orient-Institut, Istanbul, 19 February 2014. Also, E. 
GEDİK, von Opel-Rüsselsheim ‘with Love’: Tonbandbriefe von Gastarbeitern als neue Quelle der 
Oral History, in workshop Perspektivwechsel-Protokolle und Oral History-Interviews als 
Quellen einer Neuen Geschichte (der Arbeit), 11- 12 February 2019. 
58 See E. GEDİK, Migrant Organisations in Turkey and Germany: Local, Transnational and 
Global Contexts of Kurdish-Alevis from Varto, Turkey, in Urban Anthropology and Studies of 
Cultural Systems and World Economic Development. Special Issue on Turkey, vol. 40/1-2, 2011, 
p. 154. 
59 See E. GEDİK, Migrant Organizations in Turkey and Germany, cit., pp. 151-204. 
60 See E. GEDİK, H. BİRKALAN-GEDİK, N.D. Alevi Women in Transnational Space: 
Ethnic Differentiation, Multicultural Politics, or Gender Negotiation?, cit.  
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Although the Alevi migration took place since the 1960s, Alevis 
have been recognised as a distinct group since the 1990s. Massicard notes 
that “Aleviness has only recently appeared in the public spheres of 
settlement countries.” She indicates that this trend is due not so much to 
the migration process itself, as to the growing public awareness of 
questions regarding Islam” is a poignant observation and can sum up the 
current the public opinion on Alevis.61 In Europe, Alevis organised 
themselves in the late 1990s to sustain their Alevi identity first, and then to 
demand recognition in the countries they reside. Today there are Alevi 
Associations in various European countries under the confederation of 
Alevi Union Europe, has 30 years of history with autonomous identity in 
14 different European states.  
Starting in Germany, with the Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland 
e.V. (German Alevi Association), the associations soon spread out in 
Europe. Such tactics of "being" in the public space, are indeed different in 
various political-geographical contexts. In any case, they tend to go 
between attempts to camouflage such an identity to increasing claims of 
public visibility, to cope with both Turkish political developments and 
western immigration policies, as the opportunities offered by 
multiculturalist policies.62  
Alevis existed in Germany first as a part of the guest worker 
population since the 1960s. Through fluctuating waves of migration 
between Turkey and Germany, they appeared as asylum seekers and as 
political refugees, in the 1970s. The political coup d’etat of 1980 in Turkey 
was an attempt to sustain the “secular” yet Sunni-State of Turkey, causing 
many Leftist, Kurdish, and Alevi people migrate especially to Germany, 
France and Britain.63  
As of 2018, there are 292 Alevi cultural centres in Germany, with an 
estimate of 35.000 members. In the 1980s, as the Alevi identity began to 
crystallise through the Kurdish movement in Turkey and emphasised the 
religious-ethnic differences and Kurdish migration to Germany (and other 
European countries) took place. The complicated relationship of Alevi 
social participation and the political reality started to change as the 
                                                             
61 See E. MASSICARD, Alevi Communities in Western Europe: Identity and Religious 
Strategies, in Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, 2010, p. 1.  
62 See E. MASSICARD, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe. Identity and Managing 
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ethnischen und sprachlichen Grenzen: Das Beispiel Varto, in J. ZIMMERMANN, J. 
KAROLEWSKI, R. LANGER, (eds.) Transmission Process of Religious Knowledge and Ritual 
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relationship of the Alevis in the Turkish Republic, especially after the 
1990s, posed a new framework for evaluating their own identity—
especially in the light of Alevi executions and exclusions as Öker 
underlined in the interviews.64 
In Germany, because Alevism and Alevi activism and public 
awareness have a long history, and because under the German 
constitution, Alevism is recognised as a distinct religious group, Alevism 
is also taught as a separate religion in the grade-schools. Furthermore, 
Alevi Associations in Germany are also offering education for religious 
leaders. The Alevi association of Germany has organised ana-dede 
education, which refer to the religious education, taking women as equal 
and active partners of Alevi teaching, organised by the Faith Council. The 
ground-breaking point in these teachings is that women can become 
religious leaders the anas, a role until recently was reserved for men, the 
dedes, only. These new developments are taking place since 2006, as a pilot 
project, as Yılmaz Kahraman underlined.65 Although our findings shown 
that the presence of Alevi women in transnational Alevi organizations is 
negotiated between patriarchy and discourses of equality and that 
although Alevi women enjoy—a relatively limited—political participation, 
it is rather difficult to argue for a true, fully emancipated participation of 
women in the associations is fulfilling the gender gap among the male and 
female members. However, the increasing role of anas in Alevi rituals, 
interestingly, could supply some sort of emancipation, initiated and 
supported by the Alevi institutions.  
Yılmaz Kahraman had noted that the Alevi political and 
community leaders argued that the spiritual needs of Alevis living in 
Europe are different from 40-50 years ago. The religious requirements of 
Alevis that emerged in the last 15-20 years cannot be met because of dedes 
lack of speaking the German language, which is the medium of 
communication, especially among the third generation Alevi youth in 
Germany. Traditionally, the dedelik was an institution that was based on 
the lineages that were inherited through certain hearths. Therefore, the 
current teachings are in tension with the families, as dedelik was turned 
into something to be learnt, not inherited. Furthermore, Alevism has been 
taught as a research topic at the university in 8 German states. An Alevi 
curriculum at the Weingarten Pedagogical School was established to 
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65 Y. KAHRAMAN, Interview with Hande Birkalan-Gedik, Köln, 16 December 2014. 
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provide the workforce for the Alevi Religious teachings. This pilot project 
was started in 2011, and it has been officially in effect since 2014.66  
 In France, Alevism is not recognised as a distinct religious group, 
but because of the laicité, Alevism is emphasised as a part of cultural 
identity to claim recognition. In Austria, Alevism is known as a separate 
religious group as of 2015. However, the Alevi population in Austria is 
divided between several streams and newer Alevi associations outside the 
umbrella associations have been formed. Alevis are working together to 
have their religion recognised as a subject to be taught at the Austrian 
State schools. In this country, Alevism can enjoy a basic budget as a 
religious group, such as the recognition of places of worship and religious 
holidays. However, there is an increasing amount of pressure from Turkey 
also to “sunnify” the Alevi groups in Austria.  
In Switzerland they use various associative structures, but their 
distinctive religious identity from Islam is accepted and their places of 
worship are recognized. In Switzerland, Alevis organized themselves 
under İsviçre Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (The Switzerland Alevi Union’s 
Federation), which brings together the 13 Alevi associations under its 
umbrella.67 Alevism was recognised as a distinct religion only in 2012, 
despite the long migration history of Alevis to Switzerland, which begun 
in the 1960s. The number of Alevis in Switzerland has been estimated to 
be around 25.000-35.000. Of this population, some 6.000-8.000 people are 
in the Cantons of Basel-Stadt and Basel-Landschaft. On June 29, 1992, the 
first association was established. Basel ve Çevresi Alevi Bektaşi Kültür 
Birliği on January 30,1993 made its public cem in a church in Oekolampad. 
In 1997, Basel ve Çevresi Çağdaş Aleviler Derneği (The Contemporary 
Alevi Association of Basel) has been founded. Next to them also stands 
Kürdistan Aleviler Birliği/KAB (Kurdistan Alevi Association), where 
differentiation based on ethnic lines about Alevis become apparent. On 22 
December 2010 under the name of “Alevitische Religionsgemeinschaft,” a 
small acknowledgement (kleine Anerkennung) was made, and they have 
been recognised. 
In Britain, the organisation around Alevi identity in Britain began in 
the 1990s. In 2015 the Charity Commission has recognized the British 
Alevi Foundation (un umbrella organization which includes 12 Alevi 
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Rivista telematica (https://www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 17 del 2020                ISSN 1971- 8543 
centres).68 In Britain, most of the Alevis are Kurdish, who sought asylum 
in the country.69 The members underline that they had faced 
discrimination, when they were in Turkey because of the Kurdish-Alevi 
identity. Another study shows the “negative” identity of the second-
generation Alevi Kurdish youth in Britain and the projcts to overcome this 
drawback.70 Clearly, the transnational developments have local 
implications in Turkey, aiming to a betterment of the Alevi lives and their 
recognition in Turkish context.  
The Alevi situation in Britain and Switzerland should be thought in 
relation to the liberal incorporation regime, according to which migrants 
are recognized as individuals, not as ethnic groups. Therefore, there 
countries do not have policies that take migrant collective identities into 
account.71  
In Holland, Alevism has not been recognized as a distinct religious 
identity, and as a result, Holland is not allocating any budgets to help 
Alevis build their cemevis. Like the cases in Turkey, the Unity of Alevi 
Federation argues that the Sunni associations have been favoured. On the 
other hand, in neighbouring Belgium, Alevis receive financial and non-
financial support from local governments. Because of the peculiar status 
given to cultural-philosophical organizations, (which operate on a pair 
with religious organizations) such aspects of Alevi identity are 
emphasized at the cultural centres. In Denmark, Alevism has a formal 
status, as a separate religion, and effected by the Scandinavian welfare 
regimes. In Sweden, Alevis started to organize in Stockholm under an 
association called “Cultural Center for Alevis in Sweden, formed by 
people with Turkish and Kurdish origin. There are currently seven Alevi 
cultural centres in Sweden located in Stockholm, Uppsala, Halmstad, 
Gothenburg, Dalarna, Malmö and Örebro. 72 
                                                             
68 BRITAIN ALEVİ FEDERATION. Alevism, 2013. http://www.alevinet.org/ 
AjaxRequestHandler.ashx?Function=GetSecuredDOC&DOCUrl=App_Data/alevinet_org/Alevis
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on 20 February 2019]. 
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70 See C. JENKINS, Ü. ÇETİN, From a ‘Sort of Muslim’ to ‘Proud to be Alevi’: the Alevi 
Religion and Identity Project Combatting the Negative Identity among Second-Generation Alevis 
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While the presence of Alevis in different European countries point 
out different models and modes of governance, there is a transnational 
politics that affect them at a larger scale. A recent public post by the 
Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland on 07 January 2019, put forth that 
Turkey has been trying to make its “Alevi” dedes easily travel from Turkey 
to Europe with special passports given to the official state missions, which 
is suspicious. Because, at the same time, Alevism is not recognized as a 
religion on its own in Turkey, how could the Alevi religious leader be 
given special service passports? Several news agencies also speculated 
that the use of service passports for the Alevi leaders could be a 
camouflage for the Sunni leaders to come and influence the forms of 
Alevism in the diaspora. 
The role of Alevi organizations is crucial in defining an Alevi 
identity. There is a need to maximize the protection offered in different 
juridical settings. At the same time, their demands in different political-
juridical systems contribute to maintain fluid such identity and require a 
contextualization work73. The paper carries a critical "gender perspective," 
as Alevi women are assumed to hold an equal position in society, but this 
was also challenged in some recent scholarly work.74  
In Turkey, Alevis do not form a minority population under legal 
terms.75 Furthermore, their religious and ethnic distinctive character has 
been ignored in Turkey, as Alevism cross the boundaries of not only 
religion but also of ethnicity. In Germany, when Birkalan-Gedik and 
Gedik conducted interviews, many Alevi representatives underlined that 
they do not consider themselves to belong to a minority group. Since the 
notion of a minority can be defined from different angles, first let us look 
at the legal perspective about Alevis in Turkey.  
The Ottoman Empire had many religious groups, including Jews, 
Christians (Armenian, Greek, Assyrians). Although the term Kızılbaş was 
used for identifying the Alevis, they were included in the Muslim 
population. When the Turkish Republic was established in 1923, the 
Lausanne Treaty protected the rights of the religious communities. 
Turkish scholar Baskın Oran underlines that “the definition of the 
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concepts of minority and minority rights in Turkey has been based on a 
peace treaty that was signed in Lausanne on 24 July 1923, between the 
British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, and the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on one side, and Turkey on the other.”76  
When the League of Nations was formed after the First World War, 
a tripartite criterion was employed to define minorities in racial, linguistic 
and religious terms. Minorities fitting into any of these three categories 
were granted not only equal rights with the majority but also 
internationally guaranteed rights that did not apply to the majority (e.g., 
building their schools and using their language). This “positive 
discrimination” was justified by the conviction that minorities, having 
lived in disadvantageous, or even hostile environments, could not keep 
their cultural identity without any supportive measures. However, the 
Turkish delegation in Lausanne did not accept the full criterion as 
applicable to Turkey; it recognized only “non-Muslims” as constituting a 
minority and had this position accepted at the Conference. 24 July 1923 
Lausanne Peace Treaty and its annexes.”  
As a result, Turkey has employed a very narrow definition of 
minority and used it with limited applicability of the Lausanne Treaty. 
Even the rights of non-Muslim minorities that were recognized by the 
State have been continuously violated. The official position on minority 
definition and their rights are framed by the political conditions in the 
1920s and 1930s. However, they are outdated. The official position and 
state policies have been counterproductive, but with the recent legal 
reform packages, an irreversible course in favour of human rights has 
been set in Turkey. These reforms carry weight for being enacted at a time 
when the country’s political climate was charged by the “Sèvres 
Syndrome,” which carries an aura of McCarthyism against the advocates 
of minority and human rights.77 
The definition of minorities in the Lausanne was not inclusively 
based on “religion,” even though the criteria of “religion” was used for 
“non-Muslims”. Rıza Nur, the Deputy Head of Ankara Delegation at the 
Lausanne negotiations at the time, noted the following: if the parameter of 
religion been accepted, the Alevis would have also been recognized as a 
minority and therefore covered by international guarantees.78  
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7 – Discourses of “Other” vs “Equal” on Alevis 
 
As we have identified in the earlier parts of the paper, Alevis are not 
recognised as a distinct Muslim group in Turkey. The Turkish government 
considers Alevism to be an unorthodox Muslim sect as opposed to religion 
on its own right. On the one hand, the Alevis are not treated as a minority 
with the following significant political and legal consequences in everyday 
life. Still, they have been exposed to larger exclusionary policies. 
An important point is that the Alevis do not have representatives at 
the Diyanet, precisely because they are considered within the Sunni 
branch. However, they do not go to mosques for their worship. On the 
other hand, no state money is allocated for the Alevi cemevis, and the 
funding of the cemevis come from the Alevi associations and Alevi 
individuals. Therefore, both the discourses and practices towards Alevis 
in Turkey reject the idea of equality. They also do not recognise their 
differences, making their status of the even more marginal.  
The cemevis do not have the status of “religious place”: Alevi places 
of worship and Alevi religious leaders dedes, or babas, (faith leaders) are 
not officially recognised. Although Alevis are free to practice their religion 
and have been able to build new cemevis, it is no longer possible to use any 
homes in the big cities, as it was the tradition in rural Alevism, prior to 
internal and international migration. Therefore, the need for the cemevis is 
high. However, unlike mosques, cemevis do not receive financial support 
from the state. 
Another issue is about the status of the Alevi religious leaders, the 
dedes. While some argued that the dedes, just like their Sunni 
counterparts, should be paid by the Turkish state, the majority of the 
Alevis respond negatively to this proposal, as they are afraid of dedes 
being politicized by the state view of what Alevism is and how Alevism 
should be practised.79  
Furthermore, Alevis face unequal treatment in education in Turkey. 
Members of the recognised non-Muslim religious groups, which are 
protected by Lausanne can be exempted from compulsory religious 
classes in schools. No exemptions are permitted for Alevis, as they are 
considered Muslim. Thus, the Alevis are subject to mandatory religious 
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education because they are regarded as Muslim. Last, it is a vital issue to 
think about the fact that several mosques have been and are being built in 
Alevi villages and imams have been appointed in the Alevi villages, as 
strategies of assimilation and offence. 
Several international media agencies have recently reported 
aggressiveness towards the Alevis as can be seen in the following 
headlines: For instance, on 26 April 2016, in a newspaper in Vienna noted 
the discrimination of the Alevis.80 In 2017, in Malatya, a city in eastern 
Turkey, Alevi homes were marked by red crosses to identify for the 
Alevis.81 Similarly, the University of Oslo Department of Culture Studies 
and Oriental Language Policy Brief noted that there has been a growing 
Alevi-Sunni divide in Turkey.82  
While the Alevis have been openly discriminated and were exposed 
to several racist acts in Turkey, one might rightfully ask the situation of 
Alevis in Europe. Alevis negotiate their identity in different European 
countries, which have different regulations regarding religious freedom 
and minority rights. As to what kinds of legal perspectives are available to 
Alevis, Madera will respond in the following section. 
 
 
8 – Alevi Associations in Europe: Legal Perspectives 
 
The European treatments of Alevis vary from assimilation to diversity, 
integration, multiculturalism.83 In many countries, the juridical context 
influence Alevi shapes of affiliation84 and in some national contexts Alevi 
groups attempted to maximize the advantages coming from civil law, 
which offers an appropriate level of protection in coherence with 
Strasbourg case law. The European perspectives aim at making religious 
beliefs equal in their juridical protection (given that some minimal 
parameters are respected) and expands the organizational possibilities.  
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In some European countries, such as in Germany, the religious 
dimension is underlined in order to enjoy the advantages guaranteed by 
forms of church-state cooperation and their distinctiveness from Islam 
(such as gender equality, refusal of the headscarf) is emphasized to 
facilitate integration and organizational recognition in host societies.85 
This is the German case, where the Berlin Senate in 2014 recognized the 
Alevi organization-AAKM (following the previous experience of the 
recognition of the Berlin’s Islamic Federation)86 the status of religious 
community, which implies the possibility to provide religious education 
in public schools.87  
Thus, in Germany Alevi communities had no necessity to resort to 
judicial protection: they have been the “indirect beneficiaries of third-
party judicialization.”88 In this way, Alevism can enjoy the opportunity of 
improving its juridical status coming from a specific legal framework 
which showed specific solicitude towards religious entities: while in a first 
stage the endorsement of the “cultural register” facilitated access to public 
funding and a position in the public space, more recently, claims of a 
religious character opened the door to a form of public recognition and 
self-determination in internal matters. This “religious turn” had been 
emphasized through opening cemevis, changing the denomination of the 
organization to underline its religious dimension, modifying its statutes 
and its organizational structure, and giving more power to religious 
leaders (council of dedes).89  
In Britain, as a religious charity, Alevi association enjoys the 
advantages connected to this juridical status.90 Thus, in the last case 
Charity law (which accepts a wide notion of religion) in conjunction with 
a human rights approach has been undertaken. In Britain, from the 1980s 
on, mainly Kurdish and Alevi people from Central and Eastern parts of 
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Turkey have migrated to Britain and the British Alevi Federation was 
established in November 2013 as a registered charity in England and 
Wales.  
In Italy, the İtalya Alevi Bektaşi Kültür Birliği (Italian Alevi-
Bektashi Cultural Union) gained recognition as a cultural organization 
and it has links with other European confederations.91 However, currently 
in Italy there is not an updated law providing a fair level of protection of 
religious freedom to all religious groups. Presently, there is only an old 




9 – Alevism in the Turkish Legal Setting 
 
The Turkish case has at length displayed a distinctive experience of 
moderate Islam in comparison with other Muslim-majority countries, with 
its attempt to reconcile secularism and democracy with an Islamic 
landscape/framework, giving rise to an alternative model of modernity 
and increasing the Kemalist idea of an “assertive secularism” 92 which 
resulted in, as a “reaction,” a “politization of religion.”93 But as we have 
underlined at the earlier parts of the paper, the relationship of Islam to the 
Turkish State has displayed different stances, sometimes control of 
religion by the state and sometimes state’s developing an alliance with 
religion, reaching a level of a “monopolist” position on religious matters.94  
This attitude has an important impact on majority/minorities 
dynamics, as well as on the organization of religious education (which is 
under a strict state supervision).95 There seems to be a sort of 
hierarchical/pyramidal structure in the treatment of religious groups: at 
the top there is the majority religion (Sunni Islam), followed by the 
religious groups which are protected under the Lausanne Treaty. In the 
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Turkish case, Alevis needing autonomy is underestimated. The Alevi 
identity suffers from a negative characterization, as minority rights are 
perceived as “privileges” and subject to a “conditional approach.”96 
Within the constitutional framework, a restrictive perspective of religious 
freedom has been established, subject to several restrictions: specifically, 
this perception has traditionally justified limits to religious manifestations 
in the public space.97 
The recognition of the collective dimension of religious freedom is 
deeply influenced by the specific historical, political and juridical contexts 
in Turkey. The presence of a predominant Islamic majority seems to justify 
a sort of “reluctance to acknowledge” the deep diversity between religious 
communities.98 At the same time, the ideal of an “assertive secularism”99 
and the key role of national security seemed coherent with the 
disempowerment of religious communities and an underestimation of 
their associative dimension.100 
The contradiction between the attempts to establish a completely 
secular state and a regime aimed at privileging a specific religion is 
symbolized by the establishment of the Diyanet, whose purpose is 
“conducting the affairs of belief, worship and enlightening society on 
religious matters and the moral aspects of the Islamic religion.”101 The 
Diyanet has been incorporated into the public administration, it enjoys 
strong constitutional and legal protection, and its operations and staff are 
financed by public resources. The Diyanet should carry out its tasks by not 
endorsing certain religious groups (but relying on the sources of the 
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Islamic religion shared by all members of Islam).102 However, as Gözaydın 
puts forth, its way of working witnesses a “significant relationship 
between religion and nationalism.”103 As we argued earlier, religious 
services provided should be available to all citizens on an equal basis, 
without favouring any groups. The current situation is far from the ideal 
expectation, as Diyanet has no Alevi members in the council. In fact, 
academic research showed the ways in which Diyanet plays a key role in 
the “Islamization of the public space”104 “delimiting the boundaries of the 
nation along religious lines.”105  
Another paradox is the qualification of religious services as “public 
services,” which justifies a pervasive public intervention in this field. Such 
“public services” do not concern religious minorities under Lausanne 
Treaty, whose religious activities are completely entrusted to the 
autonomous organization of religious groups and funded with their own 
resources.106 Besides, the Lausanne Treaty restricts the borders of 
recognized minorities, and minorities which do not enjoy the protection 
offered by such Treaty suffer serious problems concerning their juridical, 
financial and organizational aspects.107 Further restrictions come from the 
legislative framework which constricts their opportunities of 
organizing.108 Thus, in Turkish legal framework, the treatment of religious 
minorities in Turkey is still a “grey area”109 as the following case illustrate. 
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Following a judgment by the European Court of Human Rights that this 
amounted to discrimination, the Turkish government stated in 2015 that 
cemevis will be granted legal status. However, this is yet to happen, and 
only some local administrations in Turkish provinces have declared 
cemevis as official places of worship.110 
The case of Alevism is even more complex because of their 
uncertain juridical status, due to the negative attitude of the Diyanet 
towards Alevis under Law No. 677.111 Some scholars speak about 
“trapped rights” between legislative reluctance to implement rights 
guaranteed under the Constitution and international agreements and 
excessive administrative discretion.112 Planning regulations hinder the 
effective possibility to open places of worship for religious minorities. In 
the end, places of worship are entrusted to administrative discretion, most 
of the Alevis activities are “not clearly authorized without being really 
forbidden”113 and they are continuously exposed to the risk of 
overstepping the boundaries of the legal framework that rules their 
associative life.114 
The possibility to act through religious foundations, associations, or 
groups is only a partial solution, as these structures are subject to strict 
administrative scrutiny, financial burden, risk of religious discrimination, 
finally losing their assets.115 Furthermore, which religious activities can be 
run under the juridical formula seems unclear. In short, the question 
remains open whether places of worship are entitled to operate under this 
civil structure.116 As these legal structures operate under supervision of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
demands.” See C. ÖZGÜL, Beyond Legal Victory or Reform: the Legal Mobilisation of 
Religious Groups in the European Court of Human Rights, in Religion, State & Society, vol. 45, 
2017/3-4, p. 319. 
110 See Country Policy and Information Note Turkey: Alevis.  
111 See M. YILDIRIM, A Trapped Right. The Right to Have Places of Worship in Turkey, in 
Ö. HEVAL ҪINAR, M. YILDIRIM (eds.), Freedom of Religion and Belief in Turkey, cit., p. 
172. 
112 See M. YILDIRIM, A Trapped Right, cit., p. 164; A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire 
luoghi di culto, cit., p. 550. 
113 See É. MASSICARD, Democratization in Turkey, cit., pp. 376-390. 
114 See M. YILDIRIM, The Collective Dimension of Religious Freedom, cit., p. 203. 
115 See M. YILDIRIM, The Collective Dimension of Religious Freedom, cit., p. 199 ss.  
116 See M. YILDIRIM, The Collective Dimension of Religious Freedom, cit., pp. 194-195; M. 
YILDIRIM, Are Turkey’s Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief Permissible?, cit., pp. 
183-184; A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 551. The court of first 
instance (Ankara 16th Peace Court, 5 October 2011) rejected a request of closure, coming 
from the Diyanet, of the Construction of Çankaya Cemevi. The request was linked to the 
circumstance that the association qualified as a place of worship, as its cemevi is in its 
 
82 
Rivista telematica (https://www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 17 del 2020                ISSN 1971- 8543 
public agencies (General Directorate of Associations, General Directorate 
of Foundations) which are strictly connected with government board, they 
are exposed to the influence of political climate too.117 The lack of legal 
personality implies that Alevi communities can neither directly act before 
the judicial authority, nor receive donations by their members and own 
property.118 In addition, religious leaders are not recognized a specific 
legal status, and Alevism has no access to forms of public support.119 
Recent draft law proposals seem not to satisfy the needs of all religious 
groups, their different organizational demands and their mission to run 
auxiliary secular undertakings.120 
Turkish legal system has an extremely intrusive attitude towards 
the religious phenomenon, to determine which groups deserve protection 
as autonomous religious organizations.121 Defining Alevi identity 
exclusively as a religious minority could have a negative impact in 
Turkey, considering Turkish historical-political-legal perspectives on the 
Alevis. Indeed, in Turkey claiming a “religious” identity will not result in 
being a “vector of religious liberalization” but on the contrary would 
                                                                                                                                                                       
internal statute. However, this judgement was reversed by the Court of Appeals, that 
held that statute of the association infringed Law no. 677. Thus, a court can impose the 
dissolution of such juridical entity. The Court of Appeals gave a restrictive reading of 
Law no. 677: according to the latter, only mosques and masjid are lawful places of 
worship, but it does not clarify if cemevis are to be considered equivalent to tekkes and 
zaviyes (small dervish lodges). Cfr. Court of Appeal 7th Chamber of the Civil Division, 
E/2012/262, K/2012/3351, 10 May 2012. According to Yıldırım, the provision that 
establishes that Diyanet oversees managing mosques and masjid should be read only as 
not giving such board the responsibility to administer further places of worship. Finally, 
the Joint Division of the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the court of first istance, 
relying on article 11 of the ECHR. According to the Joint Division, although limitations to 
the right to association can be prescribed by law, the pursuit of a legitimate aim and the 
necessity in a democratic society are required to limit the right to association. The Joint 
Division also underlined the close interrelationship between the right to freedom of 
religion and the possibility to establish places of worship and associations to run them. 
See Joint Civil Divisions of the Court of Appeals, 3 December 2014, E. 2014/7-1038 K. 
2014/990. 
117 See M. YILDIRIM, The Collective Dimension of Religious Freedom, cit., p. 203.  
118 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 551; M. DRESSLER, 
Turkish Politics of Doxa: Otherizing the Alevis as Heterodox, in Philosophy and Social Criticism, 
Vol. 41/4-5, 2015, pp. 445-451. 
119 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 551. 
120 See M. YILDIRIM, The Collective Dimension of Religious Freedom, cit., p. 202. 
121 See M. VAN BRUINESSEN, The Governance of Islam in Two Secular Polities: Turkey’s 
Diyanet and Indonesia’s Ministry of Religious Affairs, in European Journal of Turkish Studies, 
27/2018, pp. 1-26. 
 
83 
Rivista telematica (https://www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 17 del 2020                ISSN 1971- 8543 
underline the “otherness” of Alevism, emphasizing a sort of dichotomy 
between Muslim and non-Muslim Turkish citizens.122 In the Turkish 
context the state plays the role of “official” adjudicator of “who has a 
religious identity.”123 For this reason, claiming a religious identity would 
negatively affect the legal opportunities for Alevism of acquiring legal 
subjectivity, as it would be perceived “in oppositional terms”124 towards 
Islam.  
The main Turkish defence before the European Court is the 
incorporation of Alevism within Islam, arguing that there is no need for a 
specific treatment for Alevism, because Turkey is a secular state. Thus, 
recognizing a right to difference would undermine State secularism.125 In 
the Turkish state, Alevis were subsumed under the State’s the facto Sunni 
establishment from the earliest days of the Republic,”126 aiming at 
“assimilating” religious-ethnical minorities in Turkey.127 The real purpose 
of such policies towards minorities seems to be to “institutionalize 
religious majoritarianism as a technique of domination to reproduce 
power relations among shaping ethno-religious borders.”128 According to 
some scholars, the so-called “Alevi openings” under the Justice and 
Development Party have established a “continuity” with the past, as they 
seem to have displayed an intent “of re-framing Alevism within a 
Turkish-Islamic framework, consigning it to ‘invisibility,’ rather than as 
democratization.”129 Despite this formal approach, the real intent seemed 
                                                             
122 See E. SHAKMAN HURD, Alevis Under Law: The Politics of Religious Freedom in 
Turkey, in Journal of Law and Religion, 2014, pp. 1-3. 
123 See E. SHAKMAN HURD, Alevis Under Law, cit., p. 18. 
124 Cfr. E. ÖZYÜREK, The Light of the Alevi Fire Was Lit in Germany and Then Spread to 
Turkey: A Transnational Debate on the Boundaries of Islam, in Turkish Studies, vol. 10, 2009, p. 
247; E. SHAKMAN HURD, Alevis Under Law, cit., p. 18. 
125 See É. MASSICARD, Variations in the Judicialisation of the Alevi Issue from Turkey to 
Europe, cit., p. 97. 
126 See E. SHAKMAN HURD, Alevis Under Law, cit., 12. 
127 See E. SHAKMAN HURD, Alevis Under Law, cit., 17. 
128 See C. BOYRAZ, The Alevi Question and the Limits of Citizenship in Turkey, in British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2019, p. 2.  
129 See C. LORD, Rethinking the Justice and Development Party’s ‘Alevi openings’, cit., pp. 
278-296; I. YILMAZ, J. BARRY, The AKP’s De-Securitization and Re-Securitization of a 
Minority Community: the Alevi Opening and Closing, in Turkish Studies, vol. 21/2, 2020, pp. 
231-253; Ş. AKTÜRK, One Nation under Allah? Islamic Multiculturalism, Muslim 
Nationalism and Turkey’s Reforms for Kurds, Alevis, and non-Muslims, in Turkish Studies, vol. 
19/4, 2018, pp 523-551; B.A. SONER, Ş. TOKTAŞ, Alevis and Alevism in the Changing 
Context of Turkish Politics: The Justice and Development Party's Alevi Opening, in Turkish 
Studies, vol. 12/3, 2011, pp. 419-434; M. BARDAKÇI, The Alevi Opening of the AKP 
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to be the starting of a sort of “Islamic multiculturalism,” aimed at 
assimilating Alevism within a “universal Muslim community,”130 
obscuring Alevi more genuine demands of recognition and distinctive 
identity. 
The cultural dimension has been often emphasized as it involves a 
“degree of neutralization” providing a “safer sphere” for Alevi 
organizations and preventing their “ethnic, religious, and political 
categorizations,” which are perceived as implying a subversive 
dimension.”131 However, it cannot be underestimated that this sort of 
categorization in cultural terms would reduce the Alevi issue at the lowest 
common denominator, in view of a debatable attempt of reconciliation 
with the State. This would mask “the deep multiplicity of Alevism as a 
lived tradition,” with the risk of obscuring internal dynamics, 
empowering some leaders to represent the whole community, and 
focusing on a specific interpretation of Alevism, resulting in a weakening 
of “minorities within minorities.”132  
The persistent lack of any form of state recognition of the 
autonomous existence of this religious affiliation has emphasized an 
increasing marginalization of Alevi communities133 and trigged the 
“judicialization” of the Alevi issue,134 as “part of a broader repertory of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Government in Turkey: Walking a Tightrope between Democracy and Identity, in Turkish 
Studies, vol. 16/3, 2015, pp. 349-370; C. BOYRAZ, The Alevi Question and the Limits of 
Citizenship in Turkey, in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 46, 2019, pp. 767-780. 
130 See I. YILMAZ, J. BARRY, The AKP’s De-Securitization and Re-Securitization of a 
Minority Community, cit., pp. 231-253. 
131 Cfr. G. ORHAN, Religious Freedom Governance or Institutionalization of a Heterodox 
Religion? Turkey’s Urban Policies with Respect to Alevi Population, in Peace Human Rights 
Governance, vol. 3/2, 2019, p. 198; É. MASSICARD, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe, cit., 
pp. 134-135. On the case of Anatolian Science Culture and Cem Vakfı, the Court of 
Appeals, in order to circumvent the VGM objections, concerning the prohibition of the 
establishment of a foundation aimed at supporting a religious community (which has 
been enforced in the legislative provisions concerning foundations), emphasized the 
cultural dimension of the organization, weakening its religious character. See Court of 
Appeals, 18th Chamber, E/1995/717, K 1995/1097, January 31, 1995. See M. YILDIRIM, 
The Collective Dimension of Religious Freedom, cit., pp. 188-189. 
132 See A. EISENBERG, J. SPINNER-HALEV (eds.), Minorities within Minorities. 
Equality, Rights and Diversity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005; E. 
SHAKMAN HURD, Alevis Under Law, cit., p. 2 and pp. 19-20. About the last point, see É. 
MASSICARD, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe, cit. 
133 See C. ÖZGÜL, Beyond Legal Victory or Reform, cit., pp. 317-333.  
134 See É. MASSICARD, Variations in the Judicialisation of the Alevi Issue from Turkey to 
Europe, cit., p. 83. 
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strategic action.”135 As Massicard pointed out, the “legal arena” has 
recently become “the main battlefield” where Alevi minority claims can 
find a space of discussion in order to search for an improvement of its 
juridical status.136 The “legal channel” had been used with a “defensive” 
or “reactive” attitude in the Turkish legal context in order to claim 
“redress of perceived discriminations and the restoration of the neutrality 
of state institutions,” which is inclined to restrict religious associative 
freedom: their demands gradually changed in “competitive” or even 
“offensive” claims.137 Alevi community soon discovered the potentiality of 
the judicial discourse in order to claim their rights and a more equal 
treatment, and to “challenge the established order and contest 
discriminatory practices.”138  
As the Turkish legal setting provides no legal mechanisms 
concerning the legal recognition of religious denominations, “legal 
mobilisation with a view to reaching the EctHR, emerged as a viable 
strategy for the actors,139 when domestic legal remedies, including legal 
reform by the government, failed to solve their problems of religious 
minority communities.”140 
The European Court judgements concerning Alevism illustrates the 
striking difference between European and Turkish understanding of 
Alevi’s demands concerning recognition of cemevis and a higher level of 
pluralism in the educational contexts. The European Court, has accepted 
                                                             
135 See D. ANAGNOSTOU, L. ANDREESCU, The European Court of Human Rights in 
National Struggles Around Religion and Education, in Politics and Religion, 2018, pp. 4-6. 
136 For a study of the Turkish case law since 1990, that seems oriented at controlling all 
the initiatives which could potentially threaten the “national political project,” and at 
obscuring the “religious dimension” of Alevism, see É. MASSICARD, Variations in the 
Judicialisation of the Alevi Issue from Turkey to Europe, cit., p. 83 ff. 
137 See É. MASSICARD, Democratization in Turkey? Insights from the Alevi Issue, in C. 
RODRIGUEZ, A. AVALOS, H. YILMAZ, A. I. PLANET (eds.), Turkey's Democratization Process, 
Routledge, London - New York, 2013, pp. 376-390. 
138 See É. MASSICARD, Variations in the Judicialisation of the Alevi Issue from Turkey to 
Europe, cit., p. 94. 
139 Their main issues were the legal recognition of Alevi cemevis, the question of the 
compulsory building of mosques in Alevi villages, the problematic role of Diyanet and its 
absence of impartiality, a re-thinking of religious courses and the replacement of school 
texts which seem oriented to an Alevi-phobic attitude, the need to abolish the obligation 
to disclose religious affiliation in national identity card, protection of Alevism against 
hate crimes, state apology for Alevi massacres, the transformation of Madımak Hotel to a 
museum, putting an end to giving public places names that are offensive for Alevism, 
and the return of Alevi assets which had been confiscated by the State.  
140 See C. ÖZGÜL, Beyond Legal Victory or Reform, cit., pp. 317-333. 
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the claimed status of Alevism as an autonomous religious minority, giving 
the protection offered under article 9 and article 14 CEDU. In this 
perspective, the European judgements that will be examined in this paper 
seem to emphasize Alevi demands for a distinctive religious identity: a 
refusal of identity recognition would be in contradiction with the 
democratization processes and the implementation of religious pluralism. 
In this perspective, the “language of human rights” seems to become a 
crucial factor to emphasize Alevi claim of overcoming their status of 
marginalization and to solicit the implementation of a higher level of 
religious pluralism in the Turkish context141 and the enjoyment of effective 
rights of equal citizenship in a democratic society.142 
 
 
10 - Alevism at the European Court of Human Rights 
 
Various Alevi individuals and institutions submitted to the European 
Court's scrutiny because of several forms of discrimination suffered in 
Turkey. 143 After the recognition of the ECtHR jurisdiction in 1990 and the 
ECtHR introduction of an exception to the principle of the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies with regard to the specific Turkish context, the number 
of complaints (both individual and collective) against Turkey in front of 
European judicial boards significantly increased. Although some Alevis 
groups were at the beginning hesitant about resorting to the European 
Court, being afraid of paying a “cost” in political terms in their national 
context, eventually appealing the Strasbourg Court became the best 
strategic opportunity when they exhausted domestic remedies.144 
The European Court has been in fact expected, as a last resort, to 
represent a strategical arena where minorities could raise their dissenting 
voices. Indeed, the Strasbourg Court has traditionally shown a deep 
                                                             
141 See D. ANAGNOSTOU, L. ANDREESCU, The European Court of Human Rights in 
National Struggles Around Religion and Education, in Politics and Religion, 2018, pp. 4-6. 
142 See D. ANAGNOSTOU, L. ANDREESCU, The European Court of Human Rights in 
National Struggles Around Religion and Education, cit., pp. 4-6. 
143 The ECtHR’s judgements broadly refer to “Alevism,” “Alevi faith,” etc. In the 
ECtHR’s perspective, the crucial fact is that Alevism is a minority suffering various forms 
of discrimination in Turkey.  
144 See É. MASSICARD, Variations in the Judicialization of the Alevi Issue from Turkey to 
Europe, cit., p. 83 ff.; C. ÖZGÜL, Beyond Legal Victory or Reform, cit., pp. 317-333. Özgül 
states that their “legal mobilization” began when Alevi açılımı remained ineffective. 
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commitment towards the protection of minorities, where their visibility 
seems frustrated in domestic political processes.145  
However, the first judgements, which concern mainly identity 
cards,146 worship places and religious education in public schools, 
analysed specific complaints but sidestepped the crucial problem 
concerning the global status of Alevi communities and other minorities, 
namely the lack of recognition, the problematic role of Diyanet of 
“mediating” between “religiosity and secularism”147 and its 
discriminatory policies.148 
The role of religion in the Turkish educational system traditionally 
symbolizes a battleground between majority and minority religious 
groups, as it deeply clashes with European understanding of state 
religious neutrality, religious pluralism, religious freedom, and non-
interference in church internal matters.  
Freedom of education has a crucial role in the conventional 
                                                             
145 See EU Guidelines on the Promotion and Protection of Religion or Belief, June 2013, 
where the right to freedom of religion is protected both in individual and collective 
dimensions. It incorporates a protection of legal subjectivity and “non-interference in 
internal affairs, including the right to establish and maintain freely accessible places of 
worship or assemble, the freedom to select and train leaders or the right to carry out 
social, cultural, educational and charitable activities”. Alevi community enjoys the 
opportunity to be incorporated in this legal framework, as in 2004 the EU defined 
Alevism as a “non-Sunni Muslim minority” and the Venice Commission considered 
Alevism as a minority suffering a disadvantageous position and requiring protection. See 
E. FOKAS, J.T. RICHARDSON, The European Court of Human Rights and Minority 
Religions: Messages Generated and Messages Received, in Religion, State & Society, vol. 45/3-4, 
2017, pp. 166-173. 
146 See European Court of Human Rights, Section II, 2 February 2010 (Appl. no. 
21924/05), Sinan Işık v. Turkey. This case is about the compulsory disclosure of religious 
affiliation in national identity cards. The petitioner claimed that he was inhibited to 
include his own religious affiliation (Alevi) instead of the one stated on his identity card 
(Islam). Domestic courts dismissed such claims, holding a controversial distinction 
between “religious convictions” “religion,” or between “religion and “religious 
conviction and opinion” to maintain the legitimacy the constitutional coherence of the 
state provision (See Işık v. Turkey, no 21924/05, 2 February 2010). The European Court 
stated, that according to article 9 ECHR, the freedom of religion includes also the right 
not having to disclose one's religion or beliefs. However, no legislative changes occurred 
after this judgement. 
147 Cfr. E. KAYA, Secularism and State Religion in Modern Turkey: Law, Policymaking and 
the Diyanet, I.B. Tauris, London-New York, 2018, p. 160. The author analysed the reasons 
of the Constitutional Court’s dismissal of the claim of the Unity Party, which asked for 
the “disestablishment” of this board due its incoherence with the principle of State 
secularism (pp. 81-89). 
148 See C. ÖZGÜL, Beyond Legal Victory or Reform, cit., pp. 317-333. 
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framework: even though States enjoy a certain margin of discretion in 
setting up educational curriculum, they are forbidden to fall into forms of 
religious indoctrination and restriction of pluralism. On the contrary, in 
the Kemalist reading of secularism, education has been recognized a key 
role as a factor of national unification, resulting in a strong public 
supervision, an assimilationist approach and a refusal of cultural-religious 
diversity.149 The religious nature of courses has been even justified 
resorting to the “cultural” factor.150 In the past, only religious communities 
recognized under the Lausanne treaty enjoyed the possibility to run 
religious schools and “opt-out mechanisms”: in 1990 this possibility has 
been extended to Jehovah’s Witnesses and Turkish Protestants. The main 
Alevi claims concerned compulsory courses of religious and ethical 
education, founded on a specific (Sunni) perception of Islam, no 
opportunity for parents of minority faiths to choose a model of education 
coherent with their religious belonging, inadequate respect of religious 
differences as the possibility to be exempted from such compulsory 
courses is strictly restricted.151 However, within Alevi community there 
were divergent views about the above-mentioned issue. Some of them 
claimed for a full suppression of religious compulsory education; others 
required to share the same regime enjoyed by recognized religious 
minorities, namely, a more flexible case-by-case exemptions rule152.  
In the Hasan e Eylem Zengin case, even though the Strasbourg Court 
stated that the “Alevi faith” is “distinct from the Sunni understanding of 
Islam which is taught in schools” and that the expression “religious 
convictions” can therefore be used with regard to Alevism, it did not fully 
solve the crucial question concerning the content of religion and ethics 
                                                             
149 See C. ÖZGÜL, Freedom of Religion, the ECtHR and Grassroots Mobilization on 
Religious Education in Turkey, in Politics and Religion, vol. 12, 2019, p. 107. 
150 See M. YILDIRIM, The Collective Dimension of Religious Freedom, cit., p. 143, who 
references some case law of the Court of Cassation. 
151 See European Court of Human Rights, Former Section II, 9 October 2007 
(Application no. 1448/04), Hasan e Eylem Zengin v. Turkey. The Alevi applicants claimed 
an exemption from courses of religion and ethics in a public school for their daughter. 
The European Court had to verify whether the content of the subject was consistent with 
religious pluralism and whether parents’ convictions were granted respect in the Turkish 
educational system. Provided that Islam is the predominant religion in Turkey, the Court 
found that curricula and textbooks give greater priority to knowledge of Islam than they 
do to that of other religions and philosophies, resulting in lack of objectivity and religious 
indoctrination. See C. ÖZGÜL, Freedom of Religion, cit., pp. 107-111. 
152 See E. SHAKMAN HURD, Alevis Under Law, cit., p. 13. 
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courses, which has been faced in further judgements.153 Such content was 
deeply influenced by a Sunni understanding of Islam and Alevism was 
qualified as a “mystic interpretation of Sunnism…. the constitutive other 
through which the domination of the Sunni interpretation of Islam 
imposes its legitimacy.”154 Besides, the solution adopted in the Hasan e 
Eylem Zengin case, which extended the same possibility provided for 
Christian and Jewish minorities, leaves open the question of its 
compatibility with European framework, as it indirectly forces parents to 
disclose their religious affiliation.155  
The issue of public policies concerning the organization of spaces 
devoted to worship takes a symbolic value: in a country where a Sunni 
Islamic hegemony has been established, the meaning of cemevis “exceeds 
the boundaries of religion” and it becomes “a space of counter-culture” or 
even a “political space” and it is perceived a “threat by the state.”156 
The first judgement concerning the recognition of cemevis as places 
of worship followed the same path of previous rulings, sidestepping the 
crucial issue of Alevi juridical status. However, it made a step beyond, as 
for the very first time the question of discriminatory practices of a state 
institution against a religious minority has been raised. As the usual 
strategy to go to the ECtHR for individual cases has been abandoned, a 
decision concerning a whole religious group could potentially affect other 
minorities.157 
                                                             
153 See European Court of Human Rights, Section II, 16 September 2014 (Appl. no. 
21163/11), Mansur Yalçın & Ors v. Turkey, where the applicants claimed a contradiction of 
the curriculum with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Art. 9 taken in conjunction with 
article 14, as it contains an infringement of their religious convictions. The Court found a 
violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 as the educational system is not able to uphold and 
support appropriately the choice of parents who have religious beliefs different from 
Sunni Islam and the limited possibility of obtaining an exemption required the disclosure 
of religious beliefs. Cfr. A. PARRILLI, L’istruzione religiosa in Turchia: gli Aleviti la Corte 
europea dei Diritti Umani, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, Rivista telematica 
(https://www.statoechiese.it), 2016, no. 33, pp. 1-24. 
154 See B. TÜRKMEN, A Transformed Kemalist Islam or a New Islamic Civic Morality? A 
Study of ‘Religious Culture and Morality’ Textbooks in the Turkish High School Curricula, in 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, vol. 29, 2009/3, pp. 388-396. 
155 See A. PARRILLI, L’istruzione religiosa in Turchia, pp. 1-24. 
156 See G. ORHAN, Religious Freedom Governance, cit., pp. 195-196. 
157 See European Court of Human Rights, Section II, 2 December 2014 (Appl. no. 
32093/10), Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfi v. Turkey. An Alevi foundation 
claimed an exemption from electricity bills for cemevis, arguing that the legislation 
provided that such bills should be paid by the Directorate of Religious Affairs when 
places of worship are concerned. On the ground of Article 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination) taken together with Art. 9 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
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The İzzettin Doğan and others v. Turkey case emphasized the 
relevance of the Alevi question bringing it to the European attention: 
specifically, the alarming “asymmetry” between Alevism and majority 
religious groups which have access to "public religious services" has been 
fully displayed and it has become object of a serious concern.158  
In the present ruling, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights afforded crucial issues concerning Alevism in a global 
perspective: the opportunity for the Alevi community to enjoy religious 
services in the form of a public service; the possibility for their religious 
leaders to be qualified as such and recruited as civil servants; that their 
cemevis, can be recognized the status of places of worship; and to have 
access to state funding.159 The European Court held that there had been a 
violation of article 14 taken in conjunction with article 9 ECHR in the 
Turkish state law.  
For the very first time, the Court held that in the Turkish legal 
framework, Alevism is not provided a sufficient level of protection to its 
religious freedom of expression, and suffers a negative understanding of 
their identity, and a bias on the part of public national authorities, being 
considered as “an interpretation and practice of Islam” or a “ Sufi 
Order”160 from public agencies. According to the Court, this 
                                                                                                                                                                       
religion), the applicant foundation complained that the applicant had been deprived of 
this possibility on account of the failure to recognise the cemevis as places of worship in 
Turkey. In a judgment of May 2008, the District Court rejected the foundation’s claims, 
stating that Alevism is not a religion and that the cem houses are not places of worship. In 
its judgement dated 2 December 2014, The ECtHR found a discrimination against 
Alevism, on the ground of Art. 14 ECHR taken together with Art. 9, as Turkish 
government was not able to offer any proper justification for the difference in treatment 
between cemevis and mosques. In a following judgement, the applicant foundation was 
awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.  
158 See European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, 26 April 2016 (Appl. no. 
62649/10), İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey. The case displays that Alevis have 
provided on their own to purchase land and build cemevis; some municipalities do no 
permit building of cemevis in their urbanistic planning (Letter to the Administrative Court 
of Ankara of 2005). See M. YILDIRIM, Grand Chamber Judgement in İzzettin Doğan and 
Others v. Turkey: more than a Typical Religious Discrimination Case, in Strasbourg Observers, 
July 18, 2016, https://strasbourgobservers.com/category/cases/izzettin-dogan-and-others-v-
turkey/; A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., pp. 547-552.  
159 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., pp. 551-552; W. KÄLIN - J. 
KÜNZLI, The Law of International Human Rights Protection, 2nd Ed., Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2019, pp. 339-340. 
160 The refusal of state recognition of this community as a religious denomination 
results in the denial of its autonomous existence and its qualification within the 
prohibited Sufi orders, whose regulation comes from the law n. 677. According to this 
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understanding of Alevism is too restrictive, as Alevism owns “cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance” as an autonomous belief system.161 
Besides, the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is not coherent with 
any attempt on the part of the State to give an assessment of the legitimacy 
of religious beliefs.162 
On the contrary, the Court shows a serious effort of understanding 
the status of Alevi in Turkey, and its incoherence with the duty of state 
neutrality. In the Strasbourg Court’s perspective, its “ancient origins in the 
Turkish historical and religious context” and its “distinctive features” 
must be given appropriate weight.163 In this judgement, the Court 
significantly goes beyond previous case law, where it simply recognized 
Alevism as a branch of Islam with different religious practices (resembling 
German understanding of Alevism).164  
The Strasbourg Court emphasizes that Turkish legal setting is not 
consistent with the principle of state neutrality and impartiality, which has 
increasingly become a pivotal factor for the preservation of pluralism in a 
democratic State in the European Court’s perspective.165  
                                                                                                                                                                       
statute, Sufi orders are in principle subject to many criminal prohibitions and their 
effective situation is unclear, depending on administrative discretion in applying them. 
Such statute negatively affects therefore the juridical treatment of Alevism (e.g. the 
prohibition of tarikats and the use of some religious titles, including the title for the 
leaders of the same community, the ban on the provision of spaces for religious 
practices). Failure to comply with these prohibitions, according to the Government, is 
tolerated. However, the Legal Department of the Prime Minister before the judiciary 
boards has affirmed that "the recognition of cemevis as places of worship would be 
contrary to the law n. 677." See E. ÖKTEM, Turkish Secularism’s Ordeal with Lucifer at 
Strasbourg: Reflexions Inspired by the Işik v. Turkey Case, in Stato, Chiese e Pluralismo 
Confessionale, Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), 2020, no. 11, p. 116; A. 
MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 554.  
161 See A. PARRILLI, L’istruzione religiosa in Turchia, pp. 1-24. 
162 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 552; S. FERRARI, La Corte 
di Strasburgo e l’articolo 9 della Convenzione Europea. Un’analisi quantitativa della 
giurisprudenza, in R. MAZZOLA (ed.), Diritto e religione in Europa. Rapporto sulla 
giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo in materia di libertà religiosa, il Mulino, 
Bologna, 2012, p. 45. 
163 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 554. 
164 See É. MASSICARD, Variations in the Judicialisation of the Alevi Issue from Turkey to 
Europe, cit., p. 97. 
165 See R. UITZ, Religion and Equality: From Managing Pluralism towards a European 
Requirement of State Neutrality, in J. TEMPERMAN, T.J. GUNN, M. EVANS (eds.), The European 
Court of Human Rights and the Freedom of Religion and Belief. The 25 Years from Kokkinakis, 
Brill Nijhoff, Leiden-Boston, 2019, 223. 
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The relevance of the present judgement results from the 
overcoming of the previous fragmentary approach towards Alevism 
which the Court adopted in previous rulings. However, there is a split 
within the Court concerning the crucial relationship between Art. 9 and 
Art. 14 ECHR: the key question is whether and to what extent the Court 
can interfere with State models of management of religious diversity. On 
one hand, some judges would have preferred the court to maintain an 
attitude of “judicial moderation,”166 dealing only with the discrimination 
issues,167 on the other hand, the majority of judges made a “step forward” 
and faced the question of the rationale behind the disadvantageous 
treatment suffered by the Alevi community, which is not supported by 
reasonable standards and objective justifications.168 They did not limit 
themselves to focus on the specific claims of the applicants, but they 
targeted the most worrying aspect of the case under consideration: the 
state non-recognition of the autonomous existence of such a religious 
minority, which has a serious impact on its juridical treatment.169 Such 
treatment relates to the domestic perspective of “tolerance” rather than 
“recognition,” so the exercise of this religion, therefore, depends on the 
powers of discretion of the administrative agencies; in this regard, the 
Court emphasizes that “tolerance” cannot substitute an effective 
“recognition.”170  
Such non-recognition means a difference in treatment that requires 
an objective and reasonable justification.171 Non-recognition also implies 
that the rights enshrined under Art. 9 ECHR are weakened: this occurs if 
the extent of discretion States enjoy can result in so a narrow idea of 
religious denomination to “deprive” religious minorities of the possibility 
to exercise their basic rights.172 The denial to recognize cemevis the status 
                                                             
166 Cfr. F. TULKENS, Questioni teoriche e metodologiche sulla natura e l’oggetto delle 
sentenze della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, in R. MAZZOLA (ed.), Diritto e religione in 
Europa, cit., p. 89. 
167 See the partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion of the judges Villeger, 
Keller and Kjølbro. 
168 See M. YILDIRIM, Grand Chamber Judgement in İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, 
cit. 
169 See İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, cit., § 127. See A. MADERA, La libertà di 
aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 552; M. YILDIRIM, Grand Chamber Judgement in İzzettin Doğan 
and Others v. Turkey, cit. 
170 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 554; C. ÖZGÜL, Beyond 
Legal Victory or Reform, cit., p. 327. 
171 See E. ÖKTEM, Turkish Secularism’s Ordeal with Lucifer at Strasbourg, cit., p. 115. 
172 See İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, cit., § 114. See A. MADERA, La libertà di 
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of place of worship implies that such places of worship are subject to a 
degradation to cultural centres, in order to be consistent with the Turkish 
legal framework, several obstacles prevent their building and no public 
subsidies are granted for their management.173 Such a conduct is relevant 
under Article 9, as the freedom to establish places of worship plays a 
crucial role within the protection of the collective dimension of religious 
freedom. Otherwise, the rights that the Court guarantees would not be 
“effective” and would remain only “theoretical.”174 In this perspective, the 
refusal to recognize cemevis as places of worship cannot be reduced to a 
simple denial of a public benefit but mirrors the complete lack of juridical 
protection of Alevism as well as an infringement of the principle of non-
discrimination.175 
The judges Villiger, Keller, and Kjøbro, expressed a joint partly 
dissenting and partly concurring opinion.176 According to this, the Court 
went beyond the specific requests of the applicants, underlining instead 
the question of the absence in Turkey of a procedure for recognition of 
religious denominations. They disagree about the comparison between 
Alevis juridical treatment and the status that Sunni Islam enjoys. The 
Alevi community is not completely denied the possibility to practice its 
faith and the community can operate through alternative juridical tools 
offered by the State (associations or foundations). In this perspective, 
Alevis juridical treatment should have been compared with that of other 
religious groups expected to be in a “comparable” position under Turkish 
Law.177 The Court overstepped the more limited nature of the complaint 
concerning the violation of article 14. This opinion seems to 
                                                                                                                                                                       
aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 554. 
173 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 553. About court cases 
concerning places of worship of religious minorities (i.e. Protestants, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses), the approval of public authorities, and the impact of “established practices“ 
on their status, see M. YILDIRIM, Are Turkey’s Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief 
Permissible?, cit., pp. 179-182.  
174 See İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, cit., § 114. See A. MADERA, La libertà di 
aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 554. 
175 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 553; M. YILDIRIM, Grand 
Chamber Judgement in İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, cit. 
176 See İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, cit., joint partly dissenting and partly 
concurring opinion of judges Villiger, Keller and Kjøbro, §§ 1-28. 
177 See İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, cit., joint partly dissenting and partly 
concurring opinion of judges Villiger, Keller and Kjøbro, § 28; Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve 
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misunderstand all the matter: it does not find an interference in the 
exercise of religious freedom of Alevi community and the claim is reduced 
to a request of privileges.178 Following this opinion, Article. 9 cannot be 
interpreted  
 
“as imposing a positive obligation on a State to provide a religious 
group with religious services, to recognise their places of worship, to 
employ and pay the salaries of the group’s religious leaders and to 
allocate funds from the general budget to finance, wholly or in part, 
the group’s activities. Such an interpretation of Article 9 of the 
Convention would go too far.”179  
 
According to the words of judge Silvis in his dissenting opinion, “this is 
therefore a typical religious discrimination case, nothing more.”180  
It follows that, in the present judgement, the majority of the Court 
and the judges of the partly concurring and partly dissenting opinions 
adopt different readings not only of the test of proportionality, but also of 
the margin of appreciation and of the balancing between the subsidiary 
role of the Court and its tasks of European supervision.  
In the Turkish legal framework, the presence of a fluid legal 
framework concerning unrecognized minorities is connected with a 
peculiar model of secularism, where the strong incorporation of the 
majority religion into the state apparatus has been analysed under the 
concept of “civil religion.”181 
As we argued earlier, although religious services are formally 
supra-denominational and open to all citizens, they seem provided for 
those who embrace a Sunni understanding of Islam (as the majoritarian 
membership) and not for the religious needs of those who adhere to a 
different interpretation. In the ambit of the margin of appreciation which 
states enjoy, they can adopt justified distinctions between different 
religious denominations and provide forms of cooperation only for some 
religious groups.182 The doctrine of the margin of appreciation identifies in 
                                                             
178 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 557; See M. YILDIRIM, 
Grand Chamber Judgement in İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, cit. 
179 See İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, cit., joint partly dissenting and partly 
concurring opinion of judges Villiger, Keller and Kjøbro, § 14. 
180 See İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, cit., dissenting opinion of judge Silvis. 
181 See M. DRESSLER, Die Civil Religion der Türkei: Kemalistische und Alivitische 
Atatürk-Rezeption im Vergleich, Ergon, Würzburg, 1999. 
182 See A. LICASTRO, Il diritto statale delle religioni nei paesi dell’Unione Europea, 
Giuffrè, Milano, 2017, p. 254; J. MARTÍNEZ- TORRÓN, La (non) protezione dell’identità 
religiosa dell’individuo nella giurisprudenza della Corte di Strasburgo, in R. MAZZOLA (ed.), 
Diritto e religione in Europa, cit., p. 81; Recenti orientamenti della Corte europea dei diritti 
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domestic powers the most appropriate level of authority in order to 
neutrally govern religious freedom.183 However, such a margin does not 
imply a judicial approach of the Court of complete deference to national 
choices and it must cope with the proportionality analysis.184  
To what extent the European system of guarantees is consistent 
with national systems providing “various levels of equality?”185 The 
European Court has traditionally governed a difficult balance between 
“unity” and “diversity”186: in this perspective it considered some models 
of relationships where there is a privileged position of a denomination 
coherent with the Convention in the past. The European Court has to 
consider the “variable geometry” of religious European landscape.187 It 
has traditionally adopted a respectful approach towards different national 
models of regulation of church-state relationships which swing between 
established church models to laicité de combat, to the establishment of 
forms of “selective cooperation” only with some religious groups.188  
However, since 2000, the Court has shown an increasing solicitude 
towards the collective dimension of religious freedom, which it recognizes 
                                                                                                                                                                       
dell’uomo in materia di libertà religiosa collettiva: le pronunzie Magyar Keresztény Mennonita 
Egyház and Others v. Hungary e Church of Jesus Christ Latter-Day v. United Kingdom, in 
Anuario de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, vol. XXXI, 2015, p. 561. 
183 See S. DOMIANELLO, Conclusioni. Salutari esercizi di liberalismo ne! "farsi" del 
diritto antidiscriminatorio in materia di religione, in Quad. Dir. Poi. Eccl., 1/2013, p. 246. 
184 See M. TOSCANO, La libertà religiosa organizzata nella giurisprudenza della Corte 
europea dei diritti dell’uomo: prime linee di lettura, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), March 2008, pp. 1-29; M. TOSCANO, Il fattore 
europeo nella Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo. Itinerari giurisprudenziali, ETS, Pisa, 
2018; A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., pp. 555-556. 
185 See G. CASUSCELLI, Convenzione europea, giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei 
diritti dell’uomo e sua incidenza sul diritto ecclesiastico italiano. Un’opportunità per la ripresa del 
pluralismo confessionale?, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., September 2011, pp. 
1-58. G. CASUSCELLI, Uguaglianza e fattore religioso, in Dig. disc. pubbl., vol. XV, 1999, pp. 
428 ff. 
186 See A. LICASTRO, Unione europea e “status“ delle confessioni religiose. Fra tutela dei 
diritti umani fondamentali e salvaguardia delle identità costituzionali, Giuffrè, Milano, 2014, p. 
1.  
187 See L. ZUCCA, A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional 
Landscape, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 156-159. 
188 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., pp. 555-556; N. MARCHEI, 
La libertà religiosa nella giurisprudenza delle Corti europee, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo 
confessionale, cit., 2019, no. 33, pp. 1-35; AA.VV., Pluralismo religioso e integrazione europea: 
le nuove sfide, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 2019, no. 3, pp. 1-377; J. 
PASQUALI CERIOLI, La tutela della libertà religiosa nella Convenzione Europea dei Diritti 
dell’Uomo, Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., January 2011, pp. 1-20. 
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as a fundamental tool to guarantee and implement an effective enjoyment 
of the right of religious freedom on the part of adherents of different 
faiths.189 As Yıldırım underlines, the European Court affirmed that the 
guarantee of the collective dimension of religious freedom is at the core of 
the protection offered by article 9 ECHR.190 Infringements of the collective 
organizational dimension of religious denominations will have an 
unavoidable impact on individual religious freedom, resulting in an 
interference with its exercise of religious freedom: for these reasons, such 
interference is allowed only resorting to the circumstances foreseen in Par. 
2 of Art. 9.191 According to the Strasbourg Court, the organizational 
aspects of religious communities imply a reading of Art. 9 ECHR in 
conjunction with article 11, which safeguards freedom of association, free 
from undue state interference, but also in light of article 6, that is aimed to 
guarantee the judicial protection of the community, its members and its 
assets.192  
Such collective dimension covers the autonomy of churches of 
choosing and training their own clergy, the maintenance of places of 
worship, freedom of religious expression and right to proselytise. 
Enjoying a legal personality surely facilitates the possibility to engage in 
such activities.193  
Here, a “positive obligation” upon states should be highlighted, so 
as to provide a system of recognition which makes the access to legal 
personality available, avoiding procedures which imply “arbitrary or 
undue state interference.”194 According to the Venice of Commission, the 
                                                             
189 See M. VENTURA, Conclusioni: La virtù della giurisdizione europea sui conflitti 
religiosi, in R. MAZZOLA (ed.), Diritto e religione in Europa, cit., pp. 293-362; J.P. 
SCHOUPPE, La dimension institutionelle de la liberté de religion dans la jurisprudence de la 
Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme, A. Pedone, Paris, 2014; J. TEMPERMAN, T. JEREMY 
GUNN, M.D. EVANS (eds.), The European Court of Human Rights and the Freedom of Religion 
or Belief, Brill, Nijhoff, 2019; C. EVANS, Freedom of Religion Under the European Convention 
of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.  
190 See M. YILDIRIM, A Trapped Right, cit., p. 197. 
191 See C. EVANS, Religious freedom in European Human Rights Law: the Search for a 
Guiding Conception, in M.W. JANIS, C. EVANS (eds.), Religion and International Law, 
Martinus Nijoff Publishers, The Hague, 1999, p. 80 ff.; A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire 
luoghi di culto, cit., p. 553. 
192 See M. TOSCANO, La libertà religiosa organizzata, cit., pp. 1-28. 
193 See L. GARLICKY, Collective Aspects of the Religious Freedoms: Recent Developments 
in the Case Law of The European Court of Human Rights, in A. SAJO, (ed.), 
Censoria/Sensitivities: Free Speech and Religion in a Fundamentalist World, Eleven 
Intemational Publishing, Utrecht, 2007, p. 218 ff. 
194 See M. YILDIRIM, A Trapped Right, cit., p. 197. 
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possibility that religious groups enjoy of using alternative ways of 
organizing religious life is not an appropriate solution to compensate state 
interference and it would not most likely overcome a proportionality 
test.195 
States can restrict associative religious freedom where a legitimate 
aim occurs, as public safety or protection of the rights of others, but such 
limitations cannot result in a generalized denial of the possibility to enjoy 
juridical personality to religious groups.196 Again, going back to Yıldırım’s 
analysis, although in Turkey, the current situation is justified in light of 
specific domestic circumstances, this general prohibition would be hardly 
coherent with the parameter of proportionality between the aims pursued 
and the means required, as it would have a crucial impact on many rights 
connected with freedom of religion (Articles 6, 9, 11), even according to 
the achievement of the standards solicited by the Venice Commission.197 
The recognition of alternative measures of recognition relieves but 
does not remove the problem of state interference, as it proved to be the 
source of uncertain legal protection, forms of discrimination, risk of loss of 
control over property, arbitrary state control. In addition, such system 
denies the peculiar religious nature and identity of religious groups and 
their specific purposes of “worship, teaching, practice and observance,”198 
which deserve a regime coherent with the international standards. In this 
most recent case, the Court is pursuing the search for a “synergistic 
relationship” between Article 9 and Article 14, which allows the European 
Court a more rigorous assessment of the national systems.199  
The European Court has traditionally adopted a deferential 
approach towards Turkish lailik, justifying restrictions of individual 
freedom,200 as an “assertive” view of secularism had been claimed as a 
“bastion of democracy.”201 As Jusic underlines, “despite the otherwise low 
status of Turkey in the eyes of the Court, the Court might have previously 
                                                             
195 See Council of Europe, Venice Commission, § 55. 
196 See M. YILDIRIM, A Trapped Right, cit., pp. 199-200. 
197 See M. YILDIRIM, The Collective Dimension of Religious Freedom, cit., pp. 200-201. 
198 See M. YILDIRIM, A Trapped Right, cit., p. 203. 
199 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., p. 558; E. HOWARD, 
Freedom of Expression and Religious Hate Speech in Europe, Routledge, London-New York, 
2017, p. 53. 
200 See European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, 10 November 2005 
(application no. 44774/98), Leyla Şahín c. Turquie; European Court of Human Rights, 
Grand Chamber, 13 February 2003 (applications nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 et al.), 
Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey. 
201 See A.T. KURU, Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion, cit., p. 161. 
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treated Turkish secularism as worthy of the margin of appreciation due to 
its deference to high-status states in order to improve its own status of an 
instrument of democratization.”202 However, in cases concerning Alevism 
a turn towards more interventionism occurs.203 Indeeed, going back to 
Jusic’s analysis, “there are more likely signals that nowadays,” in many 
areas, “the Court considers Turkey to be a low-status state whose legal 
system and underlying social norms are both prone to violation of the 
Convention and generally substantively differing from the Court's view of 
human rights and secularism.”204 Furthermore, in other previous cases,205 
“the ECtHR sided with Muslim groups believed, for complex reasons, 
socially controversial, against largely Muslim CoE states with weak 
human rights records.”206 Because of the failure of Turkey to conform with 
European standards, in the İzzettin Doğan case, Strasbourg takes very 
seriously its role of protection of minority groups: since 1993 (Kokkinakis 
case),207 matters of management and inclusion of religious minorities - 
which often feel as “outsiders” - are at the centre of its intervention.208  
Therefore, the European Court fully embraces a “substantial approach,” 
which involves a more pervasive assessment of a specific model of 
regulation of church state relationships.209 In particular, the İzzettin Doğan 
case gives the European judicial authorities the opportunity, starting from 
the analysis specific issues, to analyse the crucial issue of Turkish political 
choices concerning the management of religious minorities.210  
                                                             
202 See A. JUSIC, Damned If It Doesn’t and Damned If It Does: The European Court’s 
Margin of Appreciation and the Mobilizations Around Religious Symbols, in U. Pa. J. Int’l, vol. 
39, 2018, p. 581. 
203 See D. ANAGNOSTOU, L. ANDREESCU, The European Court of Human Rights in 
National Struggles Around Religion and Education, cit., p. 9. 
204 See A. JUSIC, Damned If It Doesn’t and Damned If It Does, cit., p. 581. 
205 See European Court of Human Rights, Section II, 23 febbraio 2010 (application no. 
41135/98), Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey. 
206 See A. JUSIC, An (Un)Exceptional Case: Strasbourg’s Court Reserved Nod to Religious 
Symbols in the Courtroom, in Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, vol. 8/1, 2019, pp. 213-222. 
207 See European Court of Human Rights, 25 maggio 1993 (application no. 14307/88), 
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208 See E. FOKAS, J.T. RICHARDSON, The European Court of Human Rights and 
Minority Religions, cit., pp. 166-173; Ö. GÖNER, Turkish National Identity and Its Outsiders. 
Memories of State Violence in Dersim, Routledge, New York, 2017. 
209 See M. VENTURA, Conclusioni, cit., p. 345; J. PASQUALI CERIOLI, La tutela della 
libertà religiosa nella Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo, cit., pp. 1-20. 
210 See J. GERARDS, General Principles of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, pp. 66-67.  
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The Turkish case justifies an attitude of judicial interventionism of 
the same Court and the reduction of the margin of appreciation, which 
must be properly counterweighted by the proportionality test.211 
Proportionality facilitates the reach of a balance between conflicting 
rights and of a “more equitable redistribution of religious freedom among 
all the religious actors;” guaranteeing a “dialogue” between national and 
European judicial boards addressed to the principle of reasonableness, 
which should prevent forms of intolerable restrictions of religious 
freedom.212 Proportionality becomes a standard which allows the 
European Court to scrutinize more seriously national legal regimes213: the 
more so the States are legally equipped to grant an “appropriate balance” 
between all the competing rights, the less they are expected to be subject 
to pervasive forms of judicial interventionism by the supranational boards 
of justice.214  
Within this framework, the legitimate aim and the proportionality 
between the means and the pursued purposes have often become the 
pivotal rationale, which allows to justify even restrictions to the collective 
exercise of religious freedom.215 In the present case, the national judicial 
authorities claim that the restriction of religious freedom is prescribed by 
law and identify such a legitimate aim in the legitimate purpose of the 
protection of public order. As Alves Pinto pointed out, “public order has 
often been invoked by States to limit one’s right to manifest religion or 
                                                             
211 See A. MADERA, N. MARCHEI, Simboli religiosi “sul corpo” e ordine pubblico nel 
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Appreciation and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence oft he ECHR, Intersentia, 
Antwerp, 2002; F. JIZENG, Deference or Proportionality: Two Concepts oft he Margin of 
Appreciation in The Strasbourg Court and their Influences, in The Journal of Human Rights, vol. 
14, 2015, pp. 254-285. 
212 See A. MADERA, La libertà di aprire luoghi di culto, cit., pp. 561-562; A. RUGGERI, 
Dialogo tra le Corti, tutela dei diritti fondamentali ed evoluzione del linguaggio costituzionale, in 
Federalismi (www.federalismi.it), 27 September 2017, n. 18, pp. 1-28; R. MAZZOLA, 
Introduzione. La dottrina e i giudici di Strasburgo. Dialogo, comparazione e comprensione, in R. 
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215 See. M. ADRIAN, The Principled Slope: Religious Freedom and the European Court of 
Human Rights, in Religion, State and Society, vol. 45/3-4, 2017, pp. 174-185. 
 
100 
Rivista telematica (https://www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 17 del 2020                ISSN 1971- 8543 
belief” and “the ECtHR has often accepted this argument.”216 However the 
risk of “l’instrumentalisation, l’utilisation de mauvaise foi de la part des 
États” of public order to the detriment of religious minorities, cannot be 
underestimated.217 Indeed, the ECtHR often accepted “proportionate state 
interferences” restricting the exercise of religious freedom because of 
safeguarding public order.218 However, in its sophisticated use of a 
proportionality test, the Court gives appropriate weight to the factor of the 
necessity of the state interference in a democratic society.219 In this 
perspective, Turkish absolute refusal to guarantee legal recognition to 
some religious groups seems not coherent with the European legal 
framework, and it results in the marginalization of some religious 
minorities.220 
The Turkish case is not comparable with that of other European 
States, where some religious groups are provided with forms of bilateral 
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ordered the closure of the premises used by the applicants on the grounds that this place 
could not serve as a place of worship. The applicants were also refused, for the same 
reasons, permission to use these premises to practice their faith. According to the ECtHR, 
religious communities traditionally exist in the form of organized structures. The 
contested measures had the effect of depriving the applicants of the possibility of having 
a place reserved for their religious practice. The Court held that the inability for the 
congregations involved to enjoy an appropriate place so as to celebrate their worship 
regularly is an interference affecting their freedom of religion that it is neither 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, namely the protection of public order, nor 
necessary in a democratic society. 
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agreements, as a basic extent of religious freedom is not guaranteed to all 
religious faiths.  
Although States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, the present 
judgement declares in an unambiguous way that there is a basic level of 
protection of religious freedom that cannot be denied, even to minority 
groups, and cannot be subject to state recognition of additional guarantees 
(i.e. bilateral agreements with specific religious communities).221 The 
recognition of an effective right of manifesting one's faith, in an individual 
or collective form, cannot leave aside the enjoyment of a juridical 
treatment that facilitates the realization of the purposes of the same 
denominations: on the contrary, “the impossibility for a religious 
community religious to be provided of a place to practice his worship 
implies emptying the right to religious freedom of its essence.”222  
It cannot be underestimated that the Izzettin Doğan case contains a 
“cautious” approach towards positive measures.223 Indeed, Turkish 
inability to implement positive obligations towards this religious group 
comes from the absence of a recognition of Alevism as an autonomous 
religious group. The Court stresses that even though there is no State 
obligation in providing a “legal framework” which offers a special status 
and specific advantages to religious groups, if it offers the possibility to 
have access to a more favourable regime, it has to guarantee objective, 
plausible, and non-discriminatory parameters,224 which allow all the 
religious groups an equal opportunity to have access to it, if they wish.225  
The Court analyses whether that the applicants have received a less 
favourable treatment in comparison with religious groups enjoying 
"public religious services." However, the Court should have emphasized 
in a more compelling way the strict connection between the state refusal to 
                                                             
221 See M. TOSCANO, La libertà religiosa organizzata, cit., pp. 1-28; A. MADERA, La 
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grant the status of autonomous religious community to Alevism and the 
failure of the Turkish state to establish positive measures, aimed at 
allowing all religious groups “to fully exercise their religious rights.”226 A 
kind of judicial “reluctance” to define “the specific content of positive 
measures” appears on the contrary; a more substantial approach should 
be required towards a country, like Turkey, where paradoxically the 
“positive measures” towards religion turn into discriminatory 
interventions towards minority groups.227 
 
 
11 – Concluding Remarks on Legal Issues  
 
In our conclusion, we would like to continue with the juridical 
perspectives and then move to the social and cultural perspectives. The 
examination of EctHR judgements shows that law stresses the need of a 
basic “convergence” about the essential aspects of the exercise of religious 
freedom.228 However, the potential impact of the European judgements on 
the Alevi community status in Turkey, in the long run, remains a still 
unresolved matter. Nowadays, a crucial factor is whether and to what 
extent a genuine interest in dialoguing with European boards will be 
maintained – taking also in consideration the current Turkish political 
situation, namely, Erdoğan restrictive policies.229 In this case, the status of 
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Forum, July 17, 2020, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/hagia-sophia-islamism-and-
secularism-in-turkey. About the increasing political tendency aimed not only at “using 
religion more frequently in the political space” but also at “abolishing wealth of co-
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religious minorities could potentially become an issue of negotiation for 
access to Europe and could represent the keyword of Turkish 
democratization process. 
As protection of religious minorities is, indeed, a pre-requirement 
for access to the European Union, Turkey’s admission to the EU has 
justified European bodies involvement in such issue. Since 2011, the 
Commission “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges,” in its report 
about Turkey, emphasized that freedom of religion and the protection of 
minorities are matters where there is a need of an additional work in order 
the Turkey to comply with European standards.230 
It is well known that European Court judgement represents a 
crucial factor for the European Commission in order to “monitor” the 
implementation of a human rights perspective in applicant countries.231 
This made resorting to the European Court a strategic tool for religious 
minorities to improve their status and solicit changes in the applicant 
countries. Although Turkey engaged in changes to make its legal system 
more coherent with the European standards, it seems to be failing in its 
efforts of “re-interpreting secularism as “separation of religion and state.” 
On the contrary Turkey seems to embrace a reading of laiklik as “state 
domination of religion,”232 resulting in a “Islamo-secular” model, far from 
his “false cognate” French laicism.233 In this framework, Alevi status has 
                                                                                                                                                                       
existence, secularism and multiculturalism,” see A.E. ÖZTÜRK, Turkey’s Hagia Sophia 
Decision: A Stone that Hits No Birds, in Berkeley Forum, July 20, 2020, 
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/turkey-s-hagia-sophia-decision-a-stone-that-hits-
no-birds?fbclid=IwAR0AWc2gzGezTDpCe3kWETkitBv2 YWWa0lei-
NrO32p9LtSnJWA2hnrXjZw. According to A.E. ÖZTÜRK, Turkey’s Hagia Sophia Decision: 
The Collapse of Multiculturalism and Secularism or Something More?, in Contending 
Modernities, August 3, 2020, https://contendingmodernities.nd.edu/global-currents/hagia-
sophia-
multiculturalism/?fbclid=IwAR2qu6BaDAUowx3q10iHOPG1K86O2GJxkYuKz0kFiYeYAW7W
4QbdWbO8g3: “In this context, the way that the state decided on the status of the Alevis’ 
Cem houses of worship mirrored the way that the state - and the mentality that 
dominates it - decided on what the Hagia Sophia would be. This reveals to us that 
Turkish laicism has begun to be used instrumentally beyond this collapse to further 
indurate the roles of religion and the state because it protects Sunni Islamic values as well 
as Turkish nationalism, and is consistent with the ideological conceptions of the current 
regime.“ 
230 See E. SHAKMAN HURD, Alevis Under Law, cit., p. 16. 
231 See D. ANAGNOSTOU, L. ANDREESCU, The European Court of Human Rights in 
National Struggles Around Religion and Education, cit., p. 9. 
232 See C. ÖZGÜL, Freedom of Religion, cit., p. 110. 
233 See E. KAYA, Secularism and State Religion in Modern Turkey, cit., pp. 181-183.  
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swung between “securitization” and “re-securization policies despite the 
government, during the time, has polarized around two completely 
different ideologies (Kemalist secularism and AKP Islamic 
sectarianism).234 Both ideologies perceive religious pluralism as a “threat 
to the current socio-political and economic distribution of power in 
Turkish society.”235 Both under Kemalist and the AKP government the 
“public discourse” claimed a kind of control over religion, ignoring 
transnational trends towards globalization, international dimension of 
human rights, alternative models of modernity, the increasing role of 
religion in the public sphere, a new evolutive vision of the public-private 
border, social demands of a more democratic access to public institutions 
and of a more equal “distribution” of public resources.236 
Under the AKP government’s opening attitude towards Alevism 
seemed to develop (workshops about Alevism, promotion of Alevi 
political participation, apologies for past injuries), in order both to gain the 
Alevi support and to meet European standards. In this framework, 
controversial projects of joint places of worship (the joint mosque-cemevi 
project) developed in order to “re-institutionalize” Alevism, as well as the 
AKP government made other attempts to “reshape conflicts between 
Sunni and Alevi populations in spatial scale,” giving rise to complex 
“dynamics of negotiations and resistance between Alevis and the Turkish 
state.”237. However, this formally inclusive pattern produced poor 
outcomes in terms of acceptance of claims of legal recognition in terms of 
“human rights issues” and masked the very real intent of a rearticulating 
of Alevism instead than a “pluralist/democratic turn.”238 
Recently, Erdoğan’s discourses are oriented to sectarianism, which 
seems to be exploited even to justify his choices concerning foreign 
policies (since Gazi protests in 2013 and the Syrian war since 2014, 
towards Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen).239 In its internal policies, AKP has 
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maintained the traditional Turkish reluctance to afford the Alevi question, 
using as a justification the absence of a unitary vision of Alevism and the 
fragmentation of its organizations.240 The inclusive policies have been 
slowly given up and a more incisive turn towards the traditional 
“securitization” perspective towards the Alevi issue began to develop.241 
Such events emphasized a sort of “sectarian polarization between Alevi 
and Sunni citizens,” which resulted in religious minorities becoming an 
easy target for new offensive policies.242 Therefore, the “segregation” of 
the Alevis is still a crucial issue. The new question is whether and to what 
extent the increasing “conservative”243 attitude of the AKP government 
and its “deepening authoritarianism”244 will have an impact on Alevi 
identity claims. Besides, the possibility to enjoy the state of emergency and 
to derogate ECHR has given a certain extent of discretion, which has been 
strategically used in order to weaken European supervision.245  
A full recognition of Alevism as such is still missing. The Turkish 
state granted some accommodation to Alevi’s claims but the minimal 
changes at the educational curriculum did not satisfy minorities’ 
demands.246 Due to these changes, the Council of State made exemptions 
from religious courses not easily available, as it held that their content 
fulfils the requirements of objectivity and pluralism.247 These courses 
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received greater importance so as that the possibility to receive a secular 
education seems now increasingly restricted. Besides, the opening of the 
possibility to run secondary schools aimed at training religious leaders at 
the Imam-Hatip schools, the religious schools that are in charge of 
educating students to become Sunni religious leaders to conduct several 
religious services, implied undermining the public educational system, as 
their attendance is promoted. The prohibition of wearing Islamic 
headscarves in the educational setting has been removed too. This reform 
shows a shift in the Turkish attitude, less incline to comply with European 
addresses.  
The AKP seems even recalcitrant to welcome Alevi demands and to 
implement European decisions concerning compulsory disclosure of 
religion in national identity cards and recognition of cemevis, too. About 
the latter, the possibility to qualify cemevis as places of worship instead 
that as cultural centres are still subject of debate at political and 
administrative level and cemevis are excluded from public funding.248 The 
key role of the Diyanet in this debate must be underlined: this institution 
strongly resists the recognition of such status to cemevis, their access to 
financial advantages, and the request to stop building mosques in Alevi 
villages. The Diyanet basically consolidates the erection a sort of symbolic 
barrier between different identities, trying to reduce some of them to an 
“ethnic dimension”249. These policies point out a decreasing public 
commitment in implementing the values of secularism, pluralism and 
religious freedom250. 
Although Alevi strategic legal mobilization seems aimed at 
obtaining legitimation for their claims, a “striking decline in legal 
mobilization” has been recently noticed, because of the European 
decisions have been implemented only in a limited way, so religious 
actors are becoming aware that the Strasbourg Court’s ability to influence 
Turkish policy-makers is limited.251 Although the European Court has 
                                                                                                                                                                       
religious and ethical courses, it did not provide alternative courses, and religion has 
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adopted a more “substantial” approach,252 state policies remain strictly 
connected with their historical background253 and finding a correct 
balance between unity and diversity is not an easy path at a domestic level 
too.  
Academics notice an indirect positive impact of legal 
mobilization.254 European judgements increased collective awareness of 
the discrimination suffered and of the legitimacy of Alevi claims.255 Alevi 
mobilization offers, indeed, a counterpoint to internal policies and 
underlines an increasingly awareness in Europe of the unsatisfying results 
of the AKP policies in managing religious diversity, resulting in the 
pressing need for a more pluralist implementation of the principle of 
secularism. At the same time, scarce implementation of the EctHR’s 
judgements increased criticism towards government policies and favoured 
the emerging of organizations aimed at monitoring “the progress in 
implementation of ECHR Judgements” and boosted several forms of 
socio-political activism256, as “mobilising the law thus constitutes a form of 
participation through which the limits of the legitimate political sphere are 
renegotiated.”257 
The “challenge” the Turkish state has to afford is to find a new 
“balance” between the implementation of the collective dimension of 
religious freedom and the public interest to guarantee that the society does 
not suffer any danger from the activities of these minorities.258 Presently, 
Turkey seems to have given a reductive reading of the European 
directives concerning the collective dimension of religious freedom, 
offering selective protection to the religious majority, and providing 
religious services with a worrying state involvement, not only as 
“provider,” but also as “facilitator” and “funder”: this occurs at the 
expense of a more general protection which should cover all the 
manifestations of religious freedom with a collective dimension and all the 
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religiously affiliated entities and Turkish State does not comply with the 
“positive obligation” to provide legal mechanisms that guarantee to all 
religious communities the enjoyment of a form of legal personality 
allowing a full exercise of collective religious freedom in all its 
manifestations.259  
Such understanding of the collective dimension of religious 
freedom is strictly connected with a specific context-sensitive church-state 
model of relationship and its strong cultural-political background. 
Another factor of weakness is due to the absence of a global legal 
framework concerning religious freedom and the current fragmentation of 
issues of religious freedom in several legislative texts.260 However, a state 
whose constitution guiding principles are equality, democracy, secularism 
and freedom of religion has to reconcile its strong commitment to the 
ideals of unity and indivisibility261 with the need of an inclusive 
participation of all inhabitants, which goes through the recognition of a 
right to “differentiated citizenship,” namely the accommodation of the 
specific demands of more disadvantaged groups.262  
A first step in this more progressive direction should be the 
development of an increasing transnational judicial discourse aimed at 
promoting the human rights perspective,263 within “a global trend of 
crossing and erasing boundaries” which testifies a “cross-fertilization 
between legal cultures.”264 In this perspective, communities should be not 
perceived as fixed identities, strictly divided by “non-negotiable 
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differences,” as this trend, as Turkish legal landscape displays, risks to 
emphasize political, financial, security-related social tensions, translating 
them in unsolvable “natural sectarian divisions.”265 The focus should be 
instead on “shared goals, cross cutting affiliations, and collective 
visions.”266  
The European Court encourages the search for a common standard 
of protection and encourages “transnational dialogue” with the courts and 
national lawmakers.267 The “judicial arena” is increasing playing the role 
of “testing ground” for national models when the management of 
religious diversity is at stake.268 However, the question of the impact of the 
European judicial impact on Turkish judicial boards, and its extent, is 
complex. An initial general resistance to supremacy of supranational 
directives and a trend to emphasize state interests, even though this 
results in undermining individual rights, must be taken into 
consideration.269 In Turkey judicial boards have been deeply influenced by 
political (or even military) internal dynamics270: the judicial system is 
considered as “highly politicized” or even lacking “impartiality and 
independence”, and its rationales have often given priority to the logics of 
“state interest.”271 The specific solicitude towards internal balances results 
in judicial inconsistence.272 The judicial system has been in fact for a long 
time a “Kemalist bastion”: this factor resulted in a restrictive attitude 
towards all those organizations that were a threat for the public order 
during a first stage.  
After the AKP acquired a predominant position, the judicial system 
seems to exploit the Alevi issue to stem Islamist government trend. At the 
beginning, when domestic courts had sometimes decided in favour of 
                                                             
265 See E. SHAKMAN HURD, Alevis Under Law, cit., p. 19. 
266 See E. SHAKMAN HURD, Alevis Under Law, cit., p. 19. 
267 See S. FERRARI, La Corte di Strasburgo e l’art. 9 della Convenzione europea. Un’analisi 
quantitativa della giurisprudenza, cit., pp. 51-52; A. MADERA, Recenti orientamenti della 
Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, cit., p. 569. 
268 See É. MASSICARD, Variations in the Judicialisation of the Alevi Issue from Turkey to 
Europe, cit., p. 102. 
269 See É. MASSICARD, Variations in the Judicialisation of the Alevi Issue from Turkey to 
Europe, cit., p. 98. 
270 See V.R. SINGH, The Turkish Judicial Purges: More of the Same or Hope for a Judiciary 
That Actually Represents the Will of the People?, in Transnat’l L & Contemp. Probs., vol. 27, 
2017, p. 161 ss.  
271 See M. YILDIRIM, The Collective Dimension of Religious Freedom, cit., p. 252. 
272 See É. MASSICARD, Variations in the Judicialisation of the Alevi Issue from Turkey to 
Europe, cit., p. 90. 
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Alevism, they often rejected or sidestepped Alevi religious identity: its 
legitimacy was “conditional” to its reduction to the “non-religious 
sphere.”273 Besides, the circumstance that since 2016 the AKP has 
undertaken measures to exercise a stricter (direct and indirect) supervision 
over the judiciary cannot be neglected.274  
The Constitutional Court has traditionally implemented an 
“interventionist, restrictive, supervising, controlling” attitude towards 
religious matters, in light of the “unique circumstances of Turkey,” which 
seemed to justify intrusive state policies and the specific status of the 
Diyanet and of its staff and that different religious organizational 
structures require different “understanding of secularism” in different 
European countries.275 Anyway, the lower courts have traditionally shown 
more sensitivity towards the need of social changes, even though some of 
their rulings belong to a period when there was a more severe effort to 
meet European parameters.276  
However, a recent Court of Appeal277 seems more incline to adopt a 
more progressive trend, and the introduction of “new domestic 
remedies”278 should guarantee a higher level of implementation of the 
                                                             
273 See É. MASSICARD, Variations in the Judicialisation of the Alevi Issue from Turkey to 
Europe, cit., p. 98. 
274 See V.R. SINGH, The Turkish Judicial Purges, cit., p. 170. 
275 See M. YILDIRIM, The Collective Dimension of Religious Freedom, cit., p. 133, 
highlights a more liberal “judicial” trend since 2012: see Constitutional Court E2012/65, 
K2012/128, 20 September 2012. 
276 See É. MASSICARD, Variations in the Judicialisation of the Alevi Issue from Turkey to 
Europe, cit., p. 99, who underlines that in 2012 the Court of Cassation reversed the 
judgement of a court of first instance that licensed the registration of the Association for a 
cemevi Construction in Ankara, stating that only mosques could be recognised as places 
of worship. The court of first instance re-affirmed its previous ruling.  
277 The Turkish Court of Appeals decided to reverse a previous court judgement from 
2012 that was in favour of the Istanbul’s Electric Distribution Company (BEDAŞ), which 
sued cem houses in Istanbul for not paying their electricity bills. BEDAŞ appealed, but the 
court one again ruled in favour of the cemevi. The Turkish Supreme Court accepted an 
ECtHR ruling in 2015, stating that the verdict was also legally valid in Turkey. In 2018, 
the Higher Court of Appeals of Turkey ruled in favour of a court decision, holding the 
recognition of cemevis as places of worship and the state being charged with their utility 
bills. For elder domestic case law in favour of Alevism, coming from lower courts, see É. 
MASSICARD, Democratization in Turkey, cit., pp. 376-390. See also the abovementioned 
decision of the Joint Civil Divisions of the Court of Appeals, 3 December 2014, E. 2014/7-
1038 K. 2014/990. For a deeper analysis of this ruling, see M. YILDIRIM, Are Turkey’s 
Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief Permissible?, cit., pp. 183-184.  
278 Since 2010 the judiciary has been deeply reformed. The introduction of the 
individual application procedure in 2010 should potentially promote the implementation 
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human rights perspective.279 A more “active role” of the judiciary is 
required to implement a stricter scrutiny of the existing restrictions of 
religious freedom in its collective dimension, and their scarce coherence 
with ECHR standards.280 The judiciary should avoid forms of ideological 
fragmentation, taking advantage of the support offered by civic 
associations in order to implement its strategic position as a main 
character in the building of “a public dialogue on the development of the 
rule of law in Turkey”.281 Such interaction should favour a dialogue with 
European judicial boards in order to solicit a more effective 
implementation of “positive measures” aimed at gradually removing 
forms of discrimination founded on religious differences.  
According to this perspective, a difference in legal treatment (i.e. 
the qualification of cemevis as cultural centres) must be provided with an 
objective justification, which cannot include disputable theological 
reasons. A useful middle-term strategy could be in fact the use of the 
current legal resources offered by the lawmaker in a more coherent way 
with the constitutional guarantees to give an effective judicial remedy in 
the resolution of legal disputes concerning religious differences.282 In this 
direction, the judicial trajectory would not be aimed at overturning the 
system” but at soliciting the Turkish legal system to “hold on to its 
promises.”283 Anyway, the auspice is that the establishment of a complex 
network where different actors, legal strategies and rationales interact, 
will be able to provide new challenging opportunities for religious 
minorities and will promote significant changes in the current legal 
                                                                                                                                                                       
of human rights standards. See Law No. 5982, 13 May 2010.  
279 Cfr. O. AKBULUT, Turkey’s Reaction to the Judgements of the European Court of 
Human Rights, in International Journal of Multidisciplinary Thought, vol. 5/2, 2015, p. 82, 
about the introduction of the new constitutional complaint procedure in 2010. 
280 See M. YILDIRIM, The Collective Dimension of Religious Freedom, cit., p. 251. 
281 See V.R. SINGH, The Turkish Judicial Purges, cit., p. 197. 
282 According to M. Yıldırım, the cemevis should be included into the list of places of 
worship foreseen under section 2(f) of Act No. 2002/4100 of the Council of Ministers (12 
April 2002), which guarantees a reduced rate for utilities, and compensation for electricity 
bills (Art. 3). According with Supplementary Article 2 of the Zoning Law (No. 3194), 
public agencies should take into consideration Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution and 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In making zoning decisions for 
places of worship, municipalities should guarantee the same opportunities to mosques 
and all other places of worship. See NORWEGIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE, Alevi Cem 
Houses: Freedom of Religion or Belief in Turkey, An Input for Public Discussion, n. 3/2014. 
283 See D. ANAGNOSTOU, L. ANDREESCU, The European Court of Human Rights in 
National Struggles Around Religion and Education, cit., p. 13. 
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framework.284 Not only religious activities practices would be undermined 
otherwise but also the relevant contribution that all religious communities 
can offer to civil society would be irretrievably affected.285 
 
 
12 - Concluding Remarks on Social and Cultural Issues  
 
In the light of recent political turmoil in Turkey, Alevi population in 
Turkey continued to suffer in one way. They have been excluded from 
social and political participation not in the face of law but by the way of 
othering the Alevis. Recent reports note that, for example, several Alevi 
houses have been marked by red paint, reminiscent of the Holocaust in 
Germany. On the other hand, Alevi’s problems in Europe point out to a 
different direction. Recognized as a distinct community in most of the 
European states, Alevis continue to demand from Turkey they are 
recognized not as minority, but a distinct religious group. Lausanne 
Treaty only protected the “non-Muslims” under international law, 
without specifying the protected aspect of the minorities. While this 
included all non-Muslim subjects of the Turkish Republic, such as the 
Jews, Armenian-Christians, Orthodox Christians, and Assyrians, it did not 
include the Alevis, because they are considered as an Islamic community. 
Yet they were treated as the “other” Muslims and have faced more 
massacres throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. Most often, 
when an Alevi identity was hyphenated with Zaza or Kurdish, increase 
their vulnerability.  
Since the 1990s a Euro-Alevi identity have already emerged in 
diaspora - coming out from “silence” to the path of “recognition,” and 
effecting the Alevis in Turkey in various distinct ways. Besides, the Alevi 
Federation of Germany (as well as other umbrella associations in Europe) 
since 2014 have deliberately distanced itself from the Erdoğanist regime. 
Under the light of the political developments, the distance grows, 
although AKP government attempted to interfere with different tactics, 
such Islamization of Alevism with Sunni elements, sending imams with 
“service passports” to teach Alevism in Europe etc, Alevis condemned 
these activities though open letters to the public. Now the only way looks 
                                                             
284 See É. MASSICARD, Variations in the Judicialisation of the Alevi Issue from Turkey to 
Europe, cit., p. 102. 
285 See A. MADERA, La definizione della nozione di religione ed il ruolo della 
giurisprudenza: una comparazione fra l’ordinamento statunitense e quello italiano, in Anuario de 
Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, vol. 34, 2018, p. 572. 
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like to define Alevism-not in terms of religious orientation but in terms of 
political alliance as “outside of Islam,” a proposal which is not free of 
further social, political, and religious implications.  
 
ABSTRACT: Using interdisciplinary lenses, this article examines the 
cultural, social, and juridical status of the Alevis in Turkey and Western 
Europe. The ongoing social exclusion and discrimination against Alevis in 
Turkey make their everyday lives challenging. In Europe, Alevis 
organized themselves in associations, forming vibrant transnational 
communities. They struggled for recognition of their cultural-religious 
rights, and in some European countries, they are given special status. As 
we will illustrate, their recognition in Europe significantly effected in their 
case in Turkey but failed to emancipate them fully and posed further 
issues to tackle with and for the Alevis in Turkey. Gedik and Birkalan-
Gedik present sociological, historical, and political contexts to understand 
the current realities of Alevis in Turkey and Europe, mostly based on their 
ethnographic studies. Madera examines five cases between 2007-2016 
which were presented by the Alevis to the European Court. We conclude 
that currently, Turkey does not try to suffice the European requirements, 
namely, the implementation of policies aimed at guaranteeing adequate 
protection of the collective dimension of religious freedom in a way 
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